All the vulnerabilities related to the version 0.1.1 of the package
pnpm incorrectly parses tar archives relative to specification
It is possible to construct a tarball that, when installed via npm or parsed by the registry is safe, but when installed via pnpm is malicious, due to how pnpm parses tar archives.
The TAR format is an append-only archive format, and as such, the specification for how to update a file is to add a new record to the end with the updated version of the file. This means that it is completely valid for an archive to contain multiple copies of, say, package.json, and the expected behavior when extracting is that all versions other than the last get ignored.
This is further complicated by that during tarball extraction, all package managers are configured to drop the first path component, so collisions can be created simply by using multiple root folders in the archive, even without performing updates.
When pnpm extracts a tar archive via tar-stream, it appears to extract only the first file of a given name and discards all subsequent files with the same name.
Create a root folder with the following layout:
a/package.jsonpackage/package.jsonz/package.jsonFile contents:
{
"name": "test-package",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
"dependencies": {
"react": "^15"
}
}
{
"name": "test-package",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "This is a bad version of a test package",
"dependencies": {
"react": "^16"
}
}
{
"name": "test-package",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "This is the good version of a test package",
"dependencies": {
"react": "^17"
}
}
Then use the tar binary to produce a tarball (working directory is the root folder):
tar -c -z --format ustar -f package.tgz a package z
The order of the folders at the end matters; whichever one is last will end up being the package.json that wins when extracted by npm; the one that is first will be the one that wins when extracted by pnpm.
Install the tarball via the file: protocol.
Observe that with npm, the lockfile has react@17, while with pnpm it has react@15.
This can result in a package that appears safe on the npm registry or when installed via npm being replaced with a compromised or malicious version when installed via pnpm.
path-to-regexp contains a ReDoS
The regular expression that is vulnerable to backtracking can be generated in versions before 0.1.12 of path-to-regexp, originally reported in CVE-2024-45296
Upgrade to 0.1.12.
Avoid using two parameters within a single path segment, when the separator is not . (e.g. no /:a-:b). Alternatively, you can define the regex used for both parameters and ensure they do not overlap to allow backtracking.
on-headers is vulnerable to http response header manipulation
A bug in on-headers versions < 1.1.0 may result in response headers being inadvertently modified when an array is passed to response.writeHead()
Users should upgrade to 1.1.0
Uses are encouraged to upgrade to 1.1.0, but this issue can be worked around by passing an object to response.writeHead() rather than an array.
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.