All the vulnerabilities related to the version 1.9.10 of the package
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.
form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary
form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:
Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.
min-document vulnerable to prototype pollution
A vulnerability exists in the 'min-document' package prior to version 2.19.0, stemming from improper handling of namespace operations in the removeAttributeNS method. By processing malicious input involving the proto property, an attacker can manipulate the prototype chain of JavaScript objects, leading to denial of service or arbitrary code execution. This issue arises from insufficient validation of attribute namespace removal operations, allowing unintended modification of critical object prototypes. The vulnerability remains unaddressed in the latest available version.
ReDOS vulnerabities: multiple grammars
The Regular expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) is a Denial of Service attack, that exploits the fact that most Regular Expression implementations may reach extreme situations that cause them to work very slowly (exponentially related to input size). An attacker can then cause a program using a Regular Expression to enter these extreme situations and then hang for a very long time.
If are you are using Highlight.js to highlight user-provided data you are possibly vulnerable. On the client-side (in a browser or Electron environment) risks could include lengthy freezes or crashes... On the server-side infinite freezes could occur... effectively preventing users from accessing your app or service (ie, Denial of Service).
This is an issue with grammars shipped with the parser (and potentially 3rd party grammars also), not the parser itself. If you are using Highlight.js with any of the following grammars you are vulnerable. If you are using highlightAuto to detect the language (and have any of these grammars registered) you are vulnerable. Exponential grammars (C, Perl, JavaScript) are auto-registered when using the common grammar subset/library require('highlight.js/lib/common') as of 10.4.0 - see https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/gh/highlightjs/cdn-release@10.4.0/build/highlight.js
All versions prior to 10.4.1 are vulnerable, including version 9.18.5.
Grammars with exponential backtracking issues:
And of course any aliases of those languages have the same issue. ie: hpp is no safer than cpp.
Grammars with polynomial backtracking issues:
And again: any aliases of those languages have the same issue. ie: ruby and rb share the same ruby issues.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
http-proxy-middleware can call writeBody twice because "else if" is not used
In http-proxy-middleware before 2.0.8 and 3.x before 3.0.4, writeBody can be called twice because "else if" is not used.
http-proxy-middleware allows fixRequestBody to proceed even if bodyParser has failed
In http-proxy-middleware before 2.0.9 and 3.x before 3.0.5, fixRequestBody proceeds even if bodyParser has failed.
Denial of service in http-proxy-middleware
Versions of the package http-proxy-middleware before 2.0.7, from 3.0.0 and before 3.0.3 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) due to an UnhandledPromiseRejection error thrown by micromatch. An attacker could kill the Node.js process and crash the server by making requests to certain paths.