Codacy Coverage offers a straightforward way to integrate code coverage reporting into your Codacy projects. Version 3.1.0 builds upon the solid foundation of version 3.0.0, providing developers with a code coverage reporter designed for seamless integration with the Codacy platform. Both versions share a common core, relying on dependencies such as Bluebird for promises, Commander for command-line interface handling, Joi for schema validation, lcov-parse for processing LCOV data, Lodash for utility functions, Log-Driver for logging, and Request/Request-Promise for making HTTP requests. This ensures consistent functionality across both versions related to code coverage reporting.
A key difference between the two versions lies in their development dependencies. While both leverage testing libraries like Chai, Chai-as-promised, Dirty-Chai, Mocha, Nock, Istanbul, JSInspect for testing and code quality analysis, version 3.0.0 includes nsp (Node Security Platform) for security vulnerability checks, which is absent in version 3.1.0. This might suggest a shift in the security analysis approach or integration with other tools in the newer version. Version 3.1.0 also has a slightly increased unpacked size, indicating potential minor additions or modifications. Also, it's release date is newer so it could include recent bug fixes.
For developers, choosing between versions depends on their specific needs. If security vulnerability scanning with nsp is crucial, version 3.0.0 might be preferred. However, version 3.1.0 offers the latest updates and potential bug fixes, making it a more modern and potentially stable choice for new integrations. Both versions empower developers to easily upload and analyze code coverage data within the Codacy platform, contributing to improved code quality and maintainability.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 3.1.0 of the package
hoek subject to prototype pollution via the clone function.
hoek versions prior to 8.5.1, and 9.x prior to 9.0.3 are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the clone function. If an object with the proto key is passed to clone() the key is converted to a prototype. This issue has been patched in version 9.0.3, and backported to 8.5.1.
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.
form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary
form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:
Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.