All the vulnerabilities related to the version 5.6.1 of the package
Got allows a redirect to a UNIX socket
The got package before 11.8.5 and 12.1.0 for Node.js allows a redirect to a UNIX socket.
form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary
form-data uses Math.random()
to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:
Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici
by parrot409
-- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id
header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random()
is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data
to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
vm2 Sandbox Escape vulnerability
In vm2 for versions up to 3.9.19, Promise
handler sanitization can be bypassed, allowing attackers to escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code.
Remote Code Execution, assuming the attacker has arbitrary code execution primitive inside the context of vm2 sandbox.
None.
None.
PoC - https://gist.github.com/leesh3288/f693061e6523c97274ad5298eb2c74e9
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Thanks to Xion (SeungHyun Lee) of KAIST Hacking Lab for disclosing this vulnerability.
vm2 Sandbox Escape vulnerability
In vm2 for versions up to 3.9.19, Node.js custom inspect function allows attackers to escape the sandbox and run arbitrary code.
Remote Code Execution, assuming the attacker has arbitrary code execution primitive inside the context of vm2 sandbox.
None.
None.
PoC is to be disclosed on or after the 5th of September.
While this advisory might look similar to CVE-2023-37466, it is a completely different way of escaping the sandbox.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Thanks to Xion (SeungHyun Lee) of KAIST Hacking Lab for disclosing this vulnerability.
ip SSRF improper categorization in isPublic
The ip package through 2.0.1 for Node.js might allow SSRF because some IP addresses (such as 127.1, 01200034567, 012.1.2.3, 000:0:0000::01, and ::fFFf:127.0.0.1) are improperly categorized as globally routable via isPublic. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-42282.
@octokit/request has a Regular Expression in fetchWrapper that Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking
The regular expression /<([^>]+)>; rel="deprecation"/
used to match the link
header in HTTP responses is vulnerable to a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attack. This vulnerability arises due to the unbounded nature of the regex's matching behavior, which can lead to catastrophic backtracking when processing specially crafted input. An attacker could exploit this flaw by sending a malicious link
header, resulting in excessive CPU usage and potentially causing the server to become unresponsive, impacting service availability.
The vulnerability resides in the regular expression /<([^>]+)>; rel="deprecation"/
, which is used to match the link
header in HTTP responses. This regular expression captures content between angle brackets (<>
) followed by ; rel="deprecation"
. However, the pattern is vulnerable to ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attacks due to its susceptibility to catastrophic backtracking when processing malicious input.
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a specially crafted link
header designed to trigger excessive backtracking. For example, the following headers:
fakeHeaders.set("link", "<".repeat(100000) + ">");
fakeHeaders.set("deprecation", "true");
The crafted link
header consists of 100,000 consecutive <
characters followed by a closing >
. This input forces the regular expression engine to backtrack extensively in an attempt to match the pattern. As a result, the server can experience a significant increase in CPU usage, which may lead to denial of service, making the server unresponsive or even causing it to crash under load.
The issue is present in the following code:
const matches = responseHeaders.link && responseHeaders.link.match(/<([^>]+)>; rel="deprecation"/);
In this scenario, the link
header value triggers the regex to perform excessive backtracking, resulting in resource exhaustion and potentially causing the service to become unavailable.
import { request } from "@octokit/request";
const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
globalThis.fetch = async (url, options) => {
const response = await originalFetch(url, options);
const fakeHeaders = new Headers(response.headers);
fakeHeaders.set("link", "<".repeat(100000) + ">");
fakeHeaders.set("deprecation", "true");
return new Response(response.body, {
status: response.status,
statusText: response.statusText,
headers: fakeHeaders
});
};
request("GET /repos/octocat/hello-world")
.then(response => {
// console.log("[+] Response received:", response);
})
.catch(error => {
// console.error("[-] Error:", error);
});
// globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
This is a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability caused by a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) flaw. The vulnerability allows an attacker to craft a malicious link
header that exploits the inefficient backtracking behavior of the regular expression used in the code.
The primary impact is the potential for server resource exhaustion, specifically high CPU usage, which can cause the server to become unresponsive or even crash when processing the malicious request. This affects the availability of the service, leading to downtime or degraded performance.
The vulnerability impacts any system that uses this specific regular expression to process link
headers in HTTP responses. This can include:
link
header, making it a low-barrier attack that could be exploited by anyone.@octokit/request-error has a Regular Expression in index that Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking
A Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability exists in the processing of HTTP request headers. By sending an authorization header containing an excessively long sequence of spaces followed by a newline and "@", an attacker can exploit inefficient regular expression processing, leading to excessive resource consumption. This can significantly degrade server performance or cause a denial-of-service (DoS) condition, impacting availability.
The issue occurs at line 52 of iterator.ts in the @octokit/request-error repository.
The vulnerability is caused by the use of an inefficient regular expression in the handling of the authorization
header within the request processing logic:
authorization: options.request.headers.authorization.replace(
/ .*$/,
" [REDACTED]"
)
The regular expression / .*$/
matches a space followed by any number of characters until the end of the line. This pattern is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when processing specially crafted input. Specifically, an attacker can send an authorization
header containing a long sequence of spaces followed by a newline and "@", such as:
headers: {
authorization: "" + " ".repeat(100000) + "\n@",
}
Due to the way JavaScript's regular expression engine backtracks while attempting to match the space followed by arbitrary characters, this input can cause excessive CPU usage, significantly slowing down or even freezing the server. This leads to a denial-of-service condition, impacting availability.
import { RequestError } from "@octokit/request-error";
const error = new RequestError("Oops", 500, {
request: {
method: "POST",
url: "https://api.github.com/foo",
body: {
bar: "baz",
},
headers: {
authorization: ""+" ".repeat(100000)+"\n@",
},
},
response: {
status: 500,
url: "https://api.github.com/foo",
headers: {
"x-github-request-id": "1:2:3:4",
},
data: {
foo: "bar",
},
},
});
This is a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability
, which occurs due to an inefficient regular expression (/ .*$/
) used to sanitize the authorization
header. An attacker can craft a malicious input that triggers excessive backtracking in the regex engine, leading to high CPU consumption and potential denial-of-service (DoS).
authorization
headers are at risk, especially those processing a large volume of authentication requests.@octokit/plugin-paginate-rest has a Regular Expression in iterator Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking
For the npm package @octokit/plugin-paginate-rest
, when calling octokit.paginate.iterator()
, a specially crafted octokit
instance—particularly with a malicious link
parameter in the headers
section of the request
—can trigger a ReDoS attack.
The issue occurs at line 39 of iterator.ts in the @octokit/plugin-paginate-rest repository. The relevant code is as follows:
url = ((normalizedResponse.headers.link || "").match(
/<([^>]+)>;\s*rel="next"/,
) || [])[1];
The regular expression /<([^>]+)>;\s*rel="next"/
may lead to a potential backtracking vulnerability, resulting in a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) attack. This could cause high CPU utilization and even service slowdowns or freezes when processing specially crafted Link
headers.
import { Octokit } from "@octokit/core";
import { paginateRest } from "@octokit/plugin-paginate-rest";
const MyOctokit = Octokit.plugin(paginateRest);
const octokit = new MyOctokit({
auth: "your-github-token",
});
// Intercept the request to inject a malicious 'link' header for ReDoS
octokit.hook.wrap("request", async (request, options) => {
const maliciousLinkHeader = "" + "<".repeat(100000) + ">"; // attack string
return {
data: [],
headers: {
link: maliciousLinkHeader, // Inject malicious 'link' header
},
};
});
// Trigger the ReDoS attack by paginating through GitHub issues
(async () => {
try {
for await (const normalizedResponse of octokit.paginate.iterator(
"GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/issues", { owner: "DayShift", repo: "ReDos", per_page: 100 }
)) {
console.log({ normalizedResponse });
}
} catch (error) {
console.error("Error encountered:", error);
}
})();
This is a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability, which occurs due to excessive backtracking in the regex pattern:
/<([^>]+)>;\s*rel="next"/
When processing a specially crafted Link
header, this regex can cause significant performance degradation, leading to high CPU utilization and potential service unresponsiveness.
@octokit/plugin-paginate-rest
who call octokit.paginate.iterator()
and process untrusted or manipulated Link
headers.Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository ionicabizau/parse-url
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository ionicabizau/parse-url prior to 8.1.0.
parse-url parses http URLs incorrectly, making it vulnerable to host name spoofing
parse-url prior to 8.1.0 is vulnerable to Misinterpretation of Input. parse-url parses certain http or https URLs incorrectly, identifying the URL's protocol as ssh. It may also parse the host name incorrectly.
Authorization Bypass in parse-path
Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in GitHub repository ionicabizau/parse-path prior to 5.0.0.