All the vulnerabilities related to the version 9.7.0 of the package
Crash in HeaderParser in dicer
This affects all versions of the package dicer. A malicious attacker can send a modified form to the server and crash the Node.js service. A complete denial of service can be achieved by sending the malicious form in a loop.
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in node-forge
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code is not properly checking DigestInfo for a proper ASN.1 structure. This can lead to successful verification with signatures that contain invalid structures but a valid digest.
The issue has been addressed in node-forge 1.3.0.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Prototype Pollution in node-forge debug API.
The forge.debug API had a potential prototype pollution issue if called with untrusted input. The API was only used for internal debug purposes in a safe way and never documented or advertised. It is suspected that uses of this API, if any exist, would likely not have used untrusted inputs in a vulnerable way.
The forge.debug API and related functions were removed in 1.0.0.
Don't use the forge.debug API directly or indirectly with untrusted input.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Open Redirect in node-forge
parseUrl functionality in node-forge mishandles certain uses of backslash such as https:/\/\/\ and interprets the URI as a relative path.
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in node-forge
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code is lenient in checking the digest algorithm structure. This can allow a crafted structure that steals padding bytes and uses unchecked portion of the PKCS#1 encoded message to forge a signature when a low public exponent is being used.
The issue has been addressed in node-forge 1.3.0.
For more information, please see "Bleichenbacher's RSA signature forgery based on implementation error" by Hal Finney.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
URL parsing in node-forge could lead to undesired behavior.
The regex used for the forge.util.parseUrl API would not properly parse certain inputs resulting in a parsed data structure that could lead to undesired behavior.
forge.util.parseUrl and other very old related URL APIs were removed in 1.0.0 in favor of letting applications use the more modern WHATWG URL Standard API.
Ensure code does not directly or indirectly call forge.util.parseUrl with untrusted input.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in node-forge
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification code does not check for tailing garbage bytes after decoding a DigestInfo ASN.1 structure. This can allow padding bytes to be removed and garbage data added to forge a signature when a low public exponent is being used.
The issue has been addressed in node-forge 1.3.0.
For more information, please see "Bleichenbacher's RSA signature forgery based on implementation error" by Hal Finney.
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
jsonwebtoken unrestricted key type could lead to legacy keys usage
Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library could be misconfigured so that legacy, insecure key types are used for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.
You are affected if you are using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below
| Key type | algorithm | |----------|------------------------------------------| | ec | ES256, ES384, ES512 | | rsa | RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512 | | rsa-pss | PS256, PS384, PS512 |
And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:
| alg | Curve |
|-------|------------|
| ES256 | prime256v1 |
| ES384 | secp384r1 |
| ES512 | secp521r1 |
Update to version 9.0.0. This version validates for asymmetric key type and algorithm combinations. Please refer to the above mentioned algorithm / key type combinations for the valid secure configuration. After updating to version 9.0.0, If you still intend to continue with signing or verifying tokens using invalid key type/algorithm value combinations, you’ll need to set the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and/or verify() functions.
There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you already use a valid secure combination of key type and algorithm. Otherwise, use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and verify() functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.
jsonwebtoken's insecure implementation of key retrieval function could lead to Forgeable Public/Private Tokens from RSA to HMAC
Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library can be misconfigured so that passing a poorly implemented key retrieval function (referring to the secretOrPublicKey argument from the readme link) will result in incorrect verification of tokens. There is a possibility of using a different algorithm and key combination in verification than the one that was used to sign the tokens. Specifically, tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm. This can lead to successful validation of forged tokens.
You will be affected if your application is supporting usage of both symmetric key and asymmetric key in jwt.verify() implementation with the same key retrieval function.
Update to version 9.0.0.
There is no impact for end users
jsonwebtoken vulnerable to signature validation bypass due to insecure default algorithm in jwt.verify()
In versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library, lack of algorithm definition and a falsy secret or key in the jwt.verify() function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none algorithm for signature verification.
You will be affected if all the following are true in the jwt.verify() function:
Update to version 9.0.0 which removes the default support for the none algorithm in the jwt.verify() method.
There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you don’t need to allow for the none algorithm. If you need 'none' algorithm, you have to explicitly specify that in jwt.verify() options.
Logging of the firestore key within nodejs-firestore
A potential logging of the firestore key via logging within nodejs-firestore exists - Developers who were logging objects through this._settings would be logging the firestore key as well potentially exposing it to anyone with logs read access. We recommend upgrading to version 6.1.0 to avoid this issue
@grpc/grpc-js can allocate memory for incoming messages well above configured limits
There are two separate code paths in which memory can be allocated per message in excess of the grpc.max_receive_message_length channel option:
This has been patched in versions 1.10.9, 1.9.15, and 1.8.22
