Jest-cli version 13.2.0 introduces some updates compared to the previous stable version 13.1.3. Both versions share the core mission of providing painless JavaScript unit testing, and maintain many of the same dependencies. Key dependencies like sane, chalk, which, yargs,jest-mock,jest-util,graceful-fs,worker-farm,jest-resolve,jest-jasmine1,jest-jasmine2,jest-snapshot,jest-haste-map,lodash.template,jest-changed-files and json-stable-stringify remain consistent, ensuring a smooth transition for developers already familiar with Jest.
The primary changes are observed in the updated versions of specific Jest related sub-packages. Notably, jest-config bumps from 13.1.3 to 13.2.0, jest-runtime moves from 13.1.3 to 13.2.0 and jest-environment-jsdom jumps from 13.1.3 to 13.2.0. These updates, while seemingly minor version increments, often include bug fixes, performance improvements, and potentially new features within those specific modules. For developers, this means a potentially more stable and efficient testing environment and it is important to check the changelogs of these sub-packages.
Developers upgrading from 13.1.3 should review the changelogs for jest-config, jest-runtime, and jest-environment-jsdom to understand the specific changes and potential impact on their test suites. This granular approach will help ensure compatibility and leverage any new capabilities offered by the updated modules, keeping their testing practices up-to-date.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 13.2.0 of the package
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in micromatch
The NPM package micromatch
prior to version 4.0.8 is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The vulnerability occurs in micromatch.braces()
in index.js
because the pattern .*
will greedily match anything. By passing a malicious payload, the pattern matching will keep backtracking to the input while it doesn't find the closing bracket. As the input size increases, the consumption time will also increase until it causes the application to hang or slow down. There was a merged fix but further testing shows the issue persisted prior to https://github.com/micromatch/micromatch/pull/266. This issue should be mitigated by using a safe pattern that won't start backtracking the regular expression due to greedy matching.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in braces
A vulnerability was found in Braces versions prior to 2.3.1. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks.
Regular Expression Denial of Service in braces
Versions of braces
prior to 2.3.1 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). Untrusted input may cause catastrophic backtracking while matching regular expressions. This can cause the application to be unresponsive leading to Denial of Service.
Upgrade to version 2.3.1 or higher.
Uncontrolled resource consumption in braces
The NPM package braces
fails to limit the number of characters it can handle, which could lead to Memory Exhaustion. In lib/parse.js,
if a malicious user sends "imbalanced braces" as input, the parsing will enter a loop, which will cause the program to start allocating heap memory without freeing it at any moment of the loop. Eventually, the JavaScript heap limit is reached, and the program will crash.
Prototype Pollution in merge
All versions of package merge <2.1.1 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via _recursiveMerge .
yargs-parser Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
Affected versions of yargs-parser
are vulnerable to prototype pollution. Arguments are not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to modify the prototype of Object
, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Parsing the argument --foo.__proto__.bar baz'
adds a bar
property with value baz
to all objects. This is only exploitable if attackers have control over the arguments being passed to yargs-parser
.
Upgrade to versions 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or later.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
A vulnerability was found in diff before v3.5.0, the affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks.
OS Command Injection in node-notifier
This affects the package node-notifier before 8.0.1. It allows an attacker to run arbitrary commands on Linux machines due to the options params not being sanitised when being passed an array.
Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity in marked
What kind of vulnerability is it?
Denial of service.
The regular expression inline.reflinkSearch
may cause catastrophic backtracking against some strings.
PoC is the following.
import * as marked from 'marked';
console.log(marked.parse(`[x]: x
\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](`));
Who is impacted?
Anyone who runs untrusted markdown through marked and does not use a worker with a time limit.
Has the problem been patched?
Yes
What versions should users upgrade to?
4.0.10
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Do not run untrusted markdown through marked or run marked on a worker thread and set a reasonable time limit to prevent draining resources.
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity in marked
What kind of vulnerability is it?
Denial of service.
The regular expression block.def
may cause catastrophic backtracking against some strings.
PoC is the following.
import * as marked from "marked";
marked.parse(`[x]:${' '.repeat(1500)}x ${' '.repeat(1500)} x`);
Who is impacted?
Anyone who runs untrusted markdown through marked and does not use a worker with a time limit.
Has the problem been patched?
Yes
What versions should users upgrade to?
4.0.10
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Do not run untrusted markdown through marked or run marked on a worker thread and set a reasonable time limit to prevent draining resources.
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Command Injection in lodash
lodash
versions prior to 4.17.21 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the template function.
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request
package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request
package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request
package is no longer supported by the maintainer.
form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary
form-data uses Math.random()
to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:
Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici
by parrot409
-- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id
header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random()
is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data
to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false
mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.