All the vulnerabilities related to the version 0.4.1 of the package
Got allows a redirect to a UNIX socket
The got package before 11.8.5 and 12.1.0 for Node.js allows a redirect to a UNIX socket.
Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite due to insufficient absolute path sanitization
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.
This logic was insufficient when file paths contained repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar would only strip a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) would still resolve to an absolute path, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
3.2.2 || 4.4.14 || 5.0.6 || 6.1.1
NOTE: an adjacent issue CVE-2021-32803 affects this release level. Please ensure you update to the latest patch levels that address CVE-2021-32803 as well if this adjacent issue affects your node-tar use case.
Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom onentry method which sanitizes the entry.path or a filter method which removes entries with absolute paths.
const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')
tar.x({
file: 'archive.tgz',
// either add this function...
onentry: (entry) => {
if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
entry.path = sanitizeAbsolutePathSomehow(entry.path)
entry.absolute = path.resolve(entry.path)
}
},
// or this one
filter: (file, entry) => {
if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
return false
} else {
return true
}
}
})
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.
Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite on Windows via insufficient relative path sanitization
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain .. path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as C:some\path. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example D:\extraction\dir, then the result of path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath) would resolve against the current working directory on the C: drive, rather than the extraction target directory.
Additionally, a .. portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as C:../foo, and was not properly sanitized by the logic that checked for .. within the normalized and split portions of the path.
This only affects users of node-tar on Windows systems.
4.4.18 || 5.0.10 || 6.1.9
There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path normalization procedures that node-tar now does.
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves.
The fixed versions strip path roots from all paths prior to being resolved against the extraction target folder, even if such paths are not "absolute".
Additionally, a path starting with a drive letter and then two dots, like c:../, would bypass the check for .. path portions. This is checked properly in the patched versions.
Finally, a defense in depth check is added, such that if the entry.absolute is outside of the extraction taret, and we are not in preservePaths:true mode, a warning is raised on that entry, and it is skipped. Currently, it is believed that this check is redundant, but it did catch some oversights in development.
Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning using symbolic links
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both \ and / characters as path separators, however \ is a valid filename character on posix systems.
By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at FOO, followed by a symbolic link named foo, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the FOO directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created.
These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16, 5.0.8 and 6.1.7.
The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available below.
4.4.16 || 5.0.8 || 6.1.7
Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom filter method which prevents the extraction of symbolic links.
const tar = require('tar')
tar.x({
file: 'archive.tgz',
filter: (file, entry) => {
if (entry.type === 'SymbolicLink') {
return false
} else {
return true
}
}
})
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.
The problem is addressed in the following ways:
/ as a path separator, replacing \ with / on Windows systems, and leaving \ intact in the path on posix systems. This is performed in depth, at every level of the program where paths are consumed.Note that this means that the entry objects exposed in various parts of tar's API will now always use / as a path separator, even on Windows systems. This is not expected to cause problems, as / is a valid path separator on Windows systems, but may result in issues if entry.path is compared against a path string coming from some other API such as fs.realpath() or path.resolve().
Users are encouraged to always normalize paths using a well-tested method such as path.resolve() before comparing paths to one another.
Denial of service while parsing a tar file due to lack of folders count validation
During some analysis today on npm's node-tar package I came across the folder creation process, Basicly if you provide node-tar with a path like this ./a/b/c/foo.txt it would create every folder and sub-folder here a, b and c until it reaches the last folder to create foo.txt, In-this case I noticed that there's no validation at all on the amount of folders being created, that said we're actually able to CPU and memory consume the system running node-tar and even crash the nodejs client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside
You can reproduce this issue by downloading the tar file I provided in the resources and using node-tar to extract it, you should get the same behavior as the video
Here's a video show-casing the exploit:
Denial of service by crashing the nodejs client when attempting to parse a tar archive, make it run out of heap memory and consuming server CPU and memory resources
This report was originally reported to GitHub bug bounty program, they asked me to report it to you a month ago
Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning using symbolic links
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained two directories and a symlink with names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 "short path" counterparts. A specially crafted tar archive could thus include directories with two forms of the path that resolve to the same file system entity, followed by a symbolic link with a name in the first form, lastly followed by a file using the second form. It led to bypassing node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available below.
6.1.9 || 5.0.10 || 4.4.18
Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom filter method which prevents the extraction of symbolic links.
const tar = require('tar')
tar.x({
file: 'archive.tgz',
filter: (file, entry) => {
if (entry.type === 'SymbolicLink') {
return false
} else {
return true
}
}
})
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.
The problem is addressed in the following ways, when comparing paths in the directory cache and path reservation systems:
String.normalize('NFKD') method is used to first normalize all unicode to its maximally compatible and multi-code-point form./ on Windows systems (on posix systems, \ is a valid filename character, and thus left intact).Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory. This order of operations resulted in the directory being created and added to the node-tar directory cache. When a directory is present in the directory cache, subsequent calls to mkdir for that directory are skipped. However, this is also where node-tar checks for symlinks occur.
By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
This issue was addressed in releases 3.2.3, 4.4.15, 5.0.7 and 6.1.2.
3.2.3 || 4.4.15 || 5.0.7 || 6.1.2
Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom filter method which prevents the extraction of symbolic links.
const tar = require('tar')
tar.x({
file: 'archive.tgz',
filter: (file, entry) => {
if (entry.type === 'SymbolicLink') {
return false
} else {
return true
}
}
})
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.
chromedriver Command Injection vulnerability
Versions of the package chromedriver before 119.0.1 are vulnerable to Command Injection when setting the chromedriver.path to an arbitrary system binary. This could lead to unauthorized access and potentially malicious actions on the host system.
Note:
An attacker must have access to the system running the vulnerable chromedriver library to exploit it. The success of exploitation also depends on the permissions and privileges of the process running chromedriver.
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.
tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.
jsonwebtoken unrestricted key type could lead to legacy keys usage
Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library could be misconfigured so that legacy, insecure key types are used for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.
You are affected if you are using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below
| Key type | algorithm | |----------|------------------------------------------| | ec | ES256, ES384, ES512 | | rsa | RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512 | | rsa-pss | PS256, PS384, PS512 |
And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:
| alg | Curve |
|-------|------------|
| ES256 | prime256v1 |
| ES384 | secp384r1 |
| ES512 | secp521r1 |
Update to version 9.0.0. This version validates for asymmetric key type and algorithm combinations. Please refer to the above mentioned algorithm / key type combinations for the valid secure configuration. After updating to version 9.0.0, If you still intend to continue with signing or verifying tokens using invalid key type/algorithm value combinations, you’ll need to set the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and/or verify() functions.
There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you already use a valid secure combination of key type and algorithm. Otherwise, use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and verify() functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.
jsonwebtoken's insecure implementation of key retrieval function could lead to Forgeable Public/Private Tokens from RSA to HMAC
Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library can be misconfigured so that passing a poorly implemented key retrieval function (referring to the secretOrPublicKey argument from the readme link) will result in incorrect verification of tokens. There is a possibility of using a different algorithm and key combination in verification than the one that was used to sign the tokens. Specifically, tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm. This can lead to successful validation of forged tokens.
You will be affected if your application is supporting usage of both symmetric key and asymmetric key in jwt.verify() implementation with the same key retrieval function.
Update to version 9.0.0.
There is no impact for end users
jsonwebtoken vulnerable to signature validation bypass due to insecure default algorithm in jwt.verify()
In versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library, lack of algorithm definition and a falsy secret or key in the jwt.verify() function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none algorithm for signature verification.
You will be affected if all the following are true in the jwt.verify() function:
Update to version 9.0.0 which removes the default support for the none algorithm in the jwt.verify() method.
There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you don’t need to allow for the none algorithm. If you need 'none' algorithm, you have to explicitly specify that in jwt.verify() options.
Command Injection Vulnerability
command injection vulnerability
Problem was fixed with a parameter check. Please upgrade to version >= 5.3.1
If you cannot upgrade, be sure to check or sanitize service parameters that are passed to si.inetLatency(), si.inetChecksite(), si.services(), si.processLoad() ... do only allow strings, reject any arrays. String sanitation works as expected.
Systeminformation has command injection vulnerability in getWindowsIEEE8021x (SSID)
The SSID is not sanitized when before it is passed as a parameter to cmd.exe in the getWindowsIEEE8021x function. This means that malicious content in the SSID can be executed as OS commands.
I have exploited this vulnerability in a Windows service using version 5.22.11 of the module, to escalate privileges (in an environment where I am authorized to do so). However, as far as I can see from the code, it is still present in master branch at time of writing, on line 403/404 of network.js.
The SSID is obtained from netsh wlan show interface ... in getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID, and then passed to cmd.exe /d /s /c "netsh wlan show profiles ... in getWindowsIEEE8021x, without sanitization.
First, the command injection payload should be included in the connected Wi-Fi SSID. For example create hotspot on mobile phone or other laptop, set SSID to payload, connect to it with victim Windows system. Two example SSID's to demonstrate exploitation are below.
Demonstration to run ping command indefinitely:
a" | ping /t 127.0.0.1 &
Run executable with privileges of the user in which vulnerable function is executed. Chosen executable should should be placed in (assuming system drive is C): C:\a\a.exe.
a" | %SystemDrive%\a\a.exe &
Then, the vulnerable function can be executed on the victim system, for example, using:
const si = require('systeminformation');
si.networkInterfaces((net) => { console.log(net) });
Now the chosen command, PING.exe or a.exe will be run through the cmd.exe command line.
This vulnerability may enable an attacker, depending on how the package is used, to perform remote code execution or local privilege escalation.
Command Injection Vulnerability in systeminformation
command injection vulnerability
Problem was fixed with a parameter check. Please upgrade to version >= 5.6.4
If you cannot upgrade, be sure to check or sanitize service parameters that are passed to si.inetLatency(), si.inetChecksite(), si.services(), si.processLoad() ... do only allow strings, reject any arrays. String sanitation works as expected.