All the vulnerabilities related to the version 0.5.4 of the package
jsonwebtoken unrestricted key type could lead to legacy keys usage
Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library could be misconfigured so that legacy, insecure key types are used for signature verification. For example, DSA keys could be used with the RS256 algorithm.
You are affected if you are using an algorithm and a key type other than the combinations mentioned below
| Key type | algorithm | |----------|------------------------------------------| | ec | ES256, ES384, ES512 | | rsa | RS256, RS384, RS512, PS256, PS384, PS512 | | rsa-pss | PS256, PS384, PS512 |
And for Elliptic Curve algorithms:
| alg | Curve |
|-------|------------|
| ES256 | prime256v1 |
| ES384 | secp384r1 |
| ES512 | secp521r1 |
Update to version 9.0.0. This version validates for asymmetric key type and algorithm combinations. Please refer to the above mentioned algorithm / key type combinations for the valid secure configuration. After updating to version 9.0.0, If you still intend to continue with signing or verifying tokens using invalid key type/algorithm value combinations, you’ll need to set the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and/or verify() functions.
There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you already use a valid secure combination of key type and algorithm. Otherwise, use the allowInvalidAsymmetricKeyTypes option to true in the sign() and verify() functions to continue usage of invalid key type/algorithm combination in 9.0.0 for legacy compatibility.
jsonwebtoken's insecure implementation of key retrieval function could lead to Forgeable Public/Private Tokens from RSA to HMAC
Versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library can be misconfigured so that passing a poorly implemented key retrieval function (referring to the secretOrPublicKey argument from the readme link) will result in incorrect verification of tokens. There is a possibility of using a different algorithm and key combination in verification than the one that was used to sign the tokens. Specifically, tokens signed with an asymmetric public key could be verified with a symmetric HS256 algorithm. This can lead to successful validation of forged tokens.
You will be affected if your application is supporting usage of both symmetric key and asymmetric key in jwt.verify() implementation with the same key retrieval function.
Update to version 9.0.0.
There is no impact for end users
jsonwebtoken vulnerable to signature validation bypass due to insecure default algorithm in jwt.verify()
In versions <=8.5.1 of jsonwebtoken library, lack of algorithm definition and a falsy secret or key in the jwt.verify() function can lead to signature validation bypass due to defaulting to the none algorithm for signature verification.
You will be affected if all the following are true in the jwt.verify() function:
Update to version 9.0.0 which removes the default support for the none algorithm in the jwt.verify() method.
There will be no impact, if you update to version 9.0.0 and you don’t need to allow for the none algorithm. If you need 'none' algorithm, you have to explicitly specify that in jwt.verify() options.
Command Injection Vulnerability
command injection vulnerability
Problem was fixed with a parameter check. Please upgrade to version >= 5.3.1
If you cannot upgrade, be sure to check or sanitize service parameters that are passed to si.inetLatency(), si.inetChecksite(), si.services(), si.processLoad() ... do only allow strings, reject any arrays. String sanitation works as expected.
Systeminformation has command injection vulnerability in getWindowsIEEE8021x (SSID)
The SSID is not sanitized when before it is passed as a parameter to cmd.exe in the getWindowsIEEE8021x function. This means that malicious content in the SSID can be executed as OS commands.
I have exploited this vulnerability in a Windows service using version 5.22.11 of the module, to escalate privileges (in an environment where I am authorized to do so). However, as far as I can see from the code, it is still present in master branch at time of writing, on line 403/404 of network.js.
The SSID is obtained from netsh wlan show interface ... in getWindowsWirelessIfaceSSID, and then passed to cmd.exe /d /s /c "netsh wlan show profiles ... in getWindowsIEEE8021x, without sanitization.
First, the command injection payload should be included in the connected Wi-Fi SSID. For example create hotspot on mobile phone or other laptop, set SSID to payload, connect to it with victim Windows system. Two example SSID's to demonstrate exploitation are below.
Demonstration to run ping command indefinitely:
a" | ping /t 127.0.0.1 &
Run executable with privileges of the user in which vulnerable function is executed. Chosen executable should should be placed in (assuming system drive is C): C:\a\a.exe.
a" | %SystemDrive%\a\a.exe &
Then, the vulnerable function can be executed on the victim system, for example, using:
const si = require('systeminformation');
si.networkInterfaces((net) => { console.log(net) });
Now the chosen command, PING.exe or a.exe will be run through the cmd.exe command line.
This vulnerability may enable an attacker, depending on how the package is used, to perform remote code execution or local privilege escalation.
Command Injection Vulnerability in systeminformation
command injection vulnerability
Problem was fixed with a parameter check. Please upgrade to version >= 5.6.4
If you cannot upgrade, be sure to check or sanitize service parameters that are passed to si.inetLatency(), si.inetChecksite(), si.services(), si.processLoad() ... do only allow strings, reject any arrays. String sanitation works as expected.