Version Details and Security Vulnerabilities

An issue was discovered in ajv.validate() in Ajv (aka Another JSON Schema Validator) 6.12.2. A carefully crafted JSON schema could be provided that allows execution of other code by prototype pollution. (While untrusted schemas are recommended against, the worst case of an untrusted schema should be a denial of service, not execution of code.)

The parse method of the JSON5 library before and including version 2.2.1 does not restrict parsing of keys named __proto__, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object.

This vulnerability pollutes the prototype of the object returned by JSON5.parse and not the global Object prototype, which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution. However, polluting the prototype of a single object can have significant security impact for an application if the object is later used in trusted operations.

Impact

This vulnerability could allow an attacker to set arbitrary and unexpected keys on the object returned from JSON5.parse. The actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys, but could include denial of service, cross-site scripting, elevation of privilege, and in extreme cases, remote code execution.

Mitigation

This vulnerability is patched in json5 v2.2.2 and later. A patch has also been backported for json5 v1 in versions v1.0.2 and later.

Details

Suppose a developer wants to allow users and admins to perform some risky operation, but they want to restrict what non-admins can do. To accomplish this, they accept a JSON blob from the user, parse it using JSON5.parse, confirm that the provided data does not set some sensitive keys, and then performs the risky operation using the validated data:

const JSON5 = require('json5');

const doSomethingDangerous = (props) => {
  if (props.isAdmin) {
    console.log('Doing dangerous thing as admin.');
  } else {
    console.log('Doing dangerous thing as user.');
  }
};

const secCheckKeysSet = (obj, searchKeys) => {
  let searchKeyFound = false;
  Object.keys(obj).forEach((key) => {
    if (searchKeys.indexOf(key) > -1) {
      searchKeyFound = true;
    }
  });
  return searchKeyFound;
};

const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar"}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
  doSomethingDangerous(props); // "Doing dangerous thing as user."
} else {
  throw new Error('Forbidden...');
}

If the user attempts to set the isAdmin key, their request will be rejected:

const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar", "isAdmin": true}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
  doSomethingDangerous(props);
} else {
  throw new Error('Forbidden...'); // Error: Forbidden...
}

However, users can instead set the __proto__ key to {"isAdmin": true}. JSON5 will parse this key and will set the isAdmin key on the prototype of the returned object, allowing the user to bypass the security check and run their request as an admin:

const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar", "__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
  doSomethingDangerous(props); // "Doing dangerous thing as admin."
} else {
  throw new Error('Forbidden...');
}

Affected versions of yargs-parser are vulnerable to prototype pollution. Arguments are not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to modify the prototype of Object, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Parsing the argument --foo.__proto__.bar baz' adds a bar property with value baz to all objects. This is only exploitable if attackers have control over the arguments being passed to yargs-parser.

Recommendation

Upgrade to versions 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or later.

Prototype pollution vulnerability in function parseQuery in parseQuery.js in webpack loader-utils prior to version 2.0.3 via the name variable in parseQuery.js.