All the vulnerabilities related to the version 5.0.0 of the package
convict vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
The main use case of Convict is for handling server-side configurations written by the admins owning the servers, and not random users. So it's unlikely that an admin would deliberately sabotage their own server. Still a situation can happen where an admin not knowledgeable about JavaScript could be tricked by an attacker into writing the malicious JavaScript code into some config files.
The problem is patched in convict@6.2.4. Users should upgrade to convict@6.2.4.
No way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading
https://github.com/mozilla/node-convict/issues/410
Prototype Pollution in convict
This affects the package convict before 6.2.3. This is a bypass of CVE-2022-22143. The fix introduced, relies on the startsWith method and does not prevent the vulnerability: before splitting the path, it checks if it starts with proto or this.constructor.prototype. To bypass this check it's possible to prepend the dangerous paths with any string value followed by a dot, like for example foo.proto or foo.this.constructor.prototype.
Prototype Pollution in convict
The main use case of Convict is for handling server-side configurations written by the admins owning the servers, and not random users. So it's unlikely that an admin would deliberately sabotage their own server. Still a situation can happen where an admin not knowledgeable about JavaScript could be tricked by an attacker into writing the malicious JavaScript code into some config files.
The problem is patched in convict@6.2.3. Users should upgrade to convict@6.2.3.
No way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: add your question as a comment in #384
Prototype Pollution in JSON5 via Parse Method
The parse method of the JSON5 library before and including version 2.2.1 does not restrict parsing of keys named __proto__, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object.
This vulnerability pollutes the prototype of the object returned by JSON5.parse and not the global Object prototype, which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution. However, polluting the prototype of a single object can have significant security impact for an application if the object is later used in trusted operations.
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to set arbitrary and unexpected keys on the object returned from JSON5.parse. The actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys, but could include denial of service, cross-site scripting, elevation of privilege, and in extreme cases, remote code execution.
This vulnerability is patched in json5 v2.2.2 and later. A patch has also been backported for json5 v1 in versions v1.0.2 and later.
Suppose a developer wants to allow users and admins to perform some risky operation, but they want to restrict what non-admins can do. To accomplish this, they accept a JSON blob from the user, parse it using JSON5.parse, confirm that the provided data does not set some sensitive keys, and then performs the risky operation using the validated data:
const JSON5 = require('json5');
const doSomethingDangerous = (props) => {
if (props.isAdmin) {
console.log('Doing dangerous thing as admin.');
} else {
console.log('Doing dangerous thing as user.');
}
};
const secCheckKeysSet = (obj, searchKeys) => {
let searchKeyFound = false;
Object.keys(obj).forEach((key) => {
if (searchKeys.indexOf(key) > -1) {
searchKeyFound = true;
}
});
return searchKeyFound;
};
const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar"}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
doSomethingDangerous(props); // "Doing dangerous thing as user."
} else {
throw new Error('Forbidden...');
}
If the user attempts to set the isAdmin key, their request will be rejected:
const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar", "isAdmin": true}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
doSomethingDangerous(props);
} else {
throw new Error('Forbidden...'); // Error: Forbidden...
}
However, users can instead set the __proto__ key to {"isAdmin": true}. JSON5 will parse this key and will set the isAdmin key on the prototype of the returned object, allowing the user to bypass the security check and run their request as an admin:
const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar", "__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
doSomethingDangerous(props); // "Doing dangerous thing as admin."
} else {
throw new Error('Forbidden...');
}
Path Traversal: 'dir/../../filename' in moment.locale
This vulnerability impacts npm (server) users of moment.js, especially if user provided locale string, eg fr is directly used to switch moment locale.
This problem is patched in 2.29.2, and the patch can be applied to all affected versions (from 1.0.1 up until 2.29.1, inclusive).
Sanitize user-provided locale name before passing it to moment.js.
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Moment.js vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
The problem is patched in 2.29.4, the patch can be applied to all affected versions with minimal tweaking.
In general, given the proliferation of ReDoS attacks, it makes sense to limit the length of the user input to something sane, like 200 characters or less. I haven't seen legitimate cases of date-time strings longer than that, so all moment users who do pass a user-originating string to constructor are encouraged to apply such a rudimentary filter, that would help with this but also most future ReDoS vulnerabilities.
There is an excellent writeup of the issue here: https://github.com/moment/moment/pull/6015#issuecomment-1152961973=
The issue is rooted in the code that removes legacy comments (stuff inside parenthesis) from strings during rfc2822 parsing. moment("(".repeat(500000)) will take a few minutes to process, which is unacceptable.
validator.js has a URL validation bypass vulnerability in its isURL function
A URL validation bypass vulnerability exists in validator.js prior to version 13.15.20. The isURL() function uses '://' as a delimiter to parse protocols, while browsers use ':' as the delimiter. This parsing difference allows attackers to bypass protocol and domain validation by crafting URLs leading to XSS and Open Redirect attacks.
Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity in validator.js
validator.js prior to 13.7.0 is vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity
Validator is Vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements
Versions of the package validator before 13.15.22 are vulnerable to Incomplete Filtering of One or More Instances of Special Elements in the isLength() function that does not take into account Unicode variation selectors (\uFE0F, \uFE0E) appearing in a sequence which lead to improper string length calculation. This can lead to an application using isLength for input validation accepting strings significantly longer than intended, resulting in issues like data truncation in databases, buffer overflows in other system components, or denial-of-service.
yargs-parser Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
Affected versions of yargs-parser are vulnerable to prototype pollution. Arguments are not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to modify the prototype of Object, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Parsing the argument --foo.__proto__.bar baz' adds a bar property with value baz to all objects. This is only exploitable if attackers have control over the arguments being passed to yargs-parser.
Upgrade to versions 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or later.