Version Details and Security Vulnerabilities

Affected versions of jquery are vulnerable to cross-site scripting. This occurs because the main jquery function uses a regular expression to differentiate between HTML and selectors, but does not properly anchor the regular expression. The result is that jquery may interpret HTML as selectors when given certain inputs, allowing for client side code execution.

Proof of Concept

$("#log").html(
    $("element[attribute='<img src=\"x\" onerror=\"alert(1)\" />']").html()
);

Recommendation

Update to version 1.9.0 or later.

Versions of jquery prior to 1.9.0 are vulnerable to Cross-Site Scripting. The load method fails to recognize and remove <script> HTML tags that contain a whitespace character, i.e: </script >, which results in the enclosed script logic to be executed. This allows attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 1.9.0 or later.

Affected versions of jquery interpret text/javascript responses from cross-origin ajax requests, and automatically execute the contents in jQuery.globalEval, even when the ajax request doesn't contain the dataType option.

Recommendation

Update to version 3.0.0 or later.

jQuery from 1.1.4 until 3.4.0, as used in Drupal, Backdrop CMS, and other products, mishandles jQuery.extend(true, {}, ...) because of Object.prototype pollution. If an unsanitized source object contained an enumerable __proto__ property, it could extend the native Object.prototype.

Impact

Passing HTML from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.

Patches

This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

Workarounds

To workaround the issue without upgrading, adding the following to your code:

jQuery.htmlPrefilter = function( html ) {
	return html;
};

You need to use at least jQuery 1.12/2.2 or newer to be able to apply this workaround.

References

https://blog.jquery.com/2020/04/10/jquery-3-5-0-released/ https://jquery.com/upgrade-guide/3.5/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

Impact

Passing HTML containing <option> elements from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing them - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.

Patches

This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

Workarounds

To workaround this issue without upgrading, use DOMPurify with its SAFE_FOR_JQUERY option to sanitize the HTML string before passing it to a jQuery method.

References

https://blog.jquery.com/2020/04/10/jquery-3-5-0-released/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.

Summary

form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:

1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and
2. can control one field of a request made using form-data

Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.

This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.

Details

The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347

An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)

PoC

PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc

Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).

Impact

For an application to be vulnerable, it must:

• Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)
• Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values.

If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.

This affects the package xmlhttprequest before 1.7.0; all versions of package xmlhttprequest-ssl. Provided requests are sent synchronously (async=False on xhr.open), malicious user input flowing into xhr.send could result in arbitrary code being injected and run.