Version Details and Security Vulnerabilities

jQuery from 1.1.4 until 3.4.0, as used in Drupal, Backdrop CMS, and other products, mishandles jQuery.extend(true, {}, ...) because of Object.prototype pollution. If an unsanitized source object contained an enumerable __proto__ property, it could extend the native Object.prototype.

Impact

Passing HTML from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.

Patches

This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

Workarounds

To workaround the issue without upgrading, adding the following to your code:

jQuery.htmlPrefilter = function( html ) {
	return html;
};

You need to use at least jQuery 1.12/2.2 or newer to be able to apply this workaround.

References

https://blog.jquery.com/2020/04/10/jquery-3-5-0-released/ https://jquery.com/upgrade-guide/3.5/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

Impact

Passing HTML containing <option> elements from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing them - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.

Patches

This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

Workarounds

To workaround this issue without upgrading, use DOMPurify with its SAFE_FOR_JQUERY option to sanitize the HTML string before passing it to a jQuery method.

References

https://blog.jquery.com/2020/04/10/jquery-3-5-0-released/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

An issue was discovered in an npm 5.7.0 2018-02-21 pre-release (marked as "next: 5.7.0" and therefore automatically installed by an "npm upgrade -g npm" command, and also announced in the vendor's blog without mention of pre-release status). It might allow local users to bypass intended filesystem access restrictions because ownerships of /etc and /usr directories are being changed unexpectedly, related to a "correctMkdir" issue.

Versions of the npm CLI prior to 6.13.3 are vulnerable to an Arbitrary File Write. It fails to prevent access to folders outside of the intended node_modules folder through the bin field. A properly constructed entry in the package.json bin field would allow a package publisher to create files on a user's system when the package is installed. It is only possible to affect files that the user running npm install has access to and it is not possible to over write files that already exist on disk.

This behavior is still possible through install scripts. This vulnerability bypasses a user using the --ignore-scripts install option.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 6.13.3 or later.

Versions of the npm CLI prior to 6.13.3 are vulnerable to a symlink reference outside of node_modules. It is possible for packages to create symlinks to files outside of thenode_modules folder through the bin field upon installation. A properly constructed entry in the package.json bin field would allow a package publisher to create a symlink pointing to arbitrary files on a user’s system when the package is installed. Only files accessible by the user running the npm install are affected.

This behavior is still possible through install scripts. This vulnerability bypasses a user using the --ignore-scripts install option.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 6.13.3 or later.

Versions of the npm CLI prior to 6.13.4 are vulnerable to a Global node_modules Binary Overwrite. It fails to prevent existing globally-installed binaries to be overwritten by other package installations.

For example, if a package was installed globally and created a serve binary, any subsequent installs of packages that also create a serve binary would overwrite the first binary. This will not overwrite system binaries but only binaries put into the global node_modules directory.

This behavior is still allowed in local installations and also through install scripts. This vulnerability bypasses a user using the --ignore-scripts install option.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 6.13.4 or later.

Versions of the npm CLI prior to 6.14.6 are vulnerable to an information exposure vulnerability through log files. The CLI supports URLs like <protocol>://[<user>[:<password>]@]<hostname>[:<port>][:][/]<path>. The password value is not redacted and is printed to stdout and also to any generated log files.

Impact

Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution

node-tar aims to prevent extraction of absolute file paths by turning absolute paths into relative paths when the preservePaths flag is not set to true. This is achieved by stripping the absolute path root from any absolute file paths contained in a tar file. For example /home/user/.bashrc would turn into home/user/.bashrc.

This logic was insufficient when file paths contained repeated path roots such as ////home/user/.bashrc. node-tar would only strip a single path root from such paths. When given an absolute file path with repeating path roots, the resulting path (e.g. ///home/user/.bashrc) would still resolve to an absolute path, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.

Patches

3.2.2 || 4.4.14 || 5.0.6 || 6.1.1

NOTE: an adjacent issue CVE-2021-32803 affects this release level. Please ensure you update to the latest patch levels that address CVE-2021-32803 as well if this adjacent issue affects your node-tar use case.

Workarounds

Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom onentry method which sanitizes the entry.path or a filter method which removes entries with absolute paths.

const path = require('path')
const tar = require('tar')

tar.x({
  file: 'archive.tgz',
  // either add this function...
  onentry: (entry) => {
    if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
      entry.path = sanitizeAbsolutePathSomehow(entry.path)
      entry.absolute = path.resolve(entry.path)
    }
  },

  // or this one
  filter: (file, entry) => {
    if (path.isAbsolute(entry.path)) {
      return false
    } else {
      return true
    }
  }
})

Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patch versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.

Impact

Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution

node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain .. path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.

This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as C:some\path. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example D:\extraction\dir, then the result of path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath) would resolve against the current working directory on the C: drive, rather than the extraction target directory.

Additionally, a .. portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as C:../foo, and was not properly sanitized by the logic that checked for .. within the normalized and split portions of the path.

This only affects users of node-tar on Windows systems.

Patches

4.4.18 || 5.0.10 || 6.1.9

Workarounds

There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path normalization procedures that node-tar now does.

Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves.

Fix

The fixed versions strip path roots from all paths prior to being resolved against the extraction target folder, even if such paths are not "absolute".

Additionally, a path starting with a drive letter and then two dots, like c:../, would bypass the check for .. path portions. This is checked properly in the patched versions.

Finally, a defense in depth check is added, such that if the entry.absolute is outside of the extraction taret, and we are not in preservePaths:true mode, a warning is raised on that entry, and it is skipped. Currently, it is believed that this check is redundant, but it did catch some oversights in development.

Description:

During some analysis today on npm's node-tar package I came across the folder creation process, Basicly if you provide node-tar with a path like this ./a/b/c/foo.txt it would create every folder and sub-folder here a, b and c until it reaches the last folder to create foo.txt, In-this case I noticed that there's no validation at all on the amount of folders being created, that said we're actually able to CPU and memory consume the system running node-tar and even crash the nodejs client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside

Steps To Reproduce:

You can reproduce this issue by downloading the tar file I provided in the resources and using node-tar to extract it, you should get the same behavior as the video

Proof Of Concept:

Here's a video show-casing the exploit:

Impact

Denial of service by crashing the nodejs client when attempting to parse a tar archive, make it run out of heap memory and consuming server CPU and memory resources

Report resources

payload.txt archeive.tar.gz

Note

This report was originally reported to GitHub bug bounty program, they asked me to report it to you a month ago

A TOCTOU issue in the chownr package before 1.1.0 for Node.js 10.10 could allow a local attacker to trick it into descending into unintended directories via symlink attacks.

Versions of the package semver before 7.5.2 on the 7.x branch, before 6.3.1 on the 6.x branch, and all other versions before 5.7.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via the function new Range, when untrusted user data is provided as a range.

The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).

NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.

Hawk is an HTTP authentication scheme providing mechanisms for making authenticated HTTP requests with partial cryptographic verification of the request and response, covering the HTTP method, request URI, host, and optionally the request payload. Hawk used a regular expression to parse Host HTTP header (Hawk.utils.parseHost()), which was subject to regular expression DoS attack - meaning each added character in the attacker's input increases the computation time exponentially. parseHost() was patched in 9.0.1 to use built-in URL class to parse hostname instead.Hawk.authenticate() accepts options argument. If that contains host and port, those would be used instead of a call to utils.parseHost().

Versions of hoek prior to 4.2.1 and 5.0.3 are vulnerable to prototype pollution.

The merge function, and the applyToDefaults and applyToDefaultsWithShallow functions which leverage merge behind the scenes, are vulnerable to a prototype pollution attack when provided an unvalidated payload created from a JSON string containing the __proto__ property.

This can be demonstrated like so:

var Hoek = require('hoek');
var malicious_payload = '{"__proto__":{"oops":"It works !"}}';

var a = {};
console.log("Before : " + a.oops);
Hoek.merge({}, JSON.parse(malicious_payload));
console.log("After : " + a.oops);

This type of attack can be used to overwrite existing properties causing a potential denial of service.

Recommendation

Update to version 4.2.1, 5.0.3 or later.

hoek versions prior to 8.5.1, and 9.x prior to 9.0.3 are vulnerable to prototype pollution in the clone function. If an object with the proto key is passed to clone() the key is converted to a prototype. This issue has been patched in version 9.0.3, and backported to 8.5.1.

Summary

form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:

1. can observe other values produced by Math.random in the target application, and
2. can control one field of a request made using form-data

Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.

This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.

Details

The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347

An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)

PoC

PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc

Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).

Impact

For an application to be vulnerable, it must:

• Use form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)
• Reveal values of Math.random(). It's easiest if the attacker can observe multiple sequential values, but more complex math could recover the PRNG state to some degree of confidence with non-sequential values.

If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.

Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.

Versions of tunnel-agent before 0.6.0 are vulnerable to memory exposure.

This is exploitable if user supplied input is provided to the auth value and is a number.

Proof-of-concept:

require('request')({
  method: 'GET',
  uri: 'http://www.example.com',
  tunnel: true,
  proxy:{
    protocol: 'http:',
    host:'127.0.0.1',
    port:8080,
    auth:USERSUPPLIEDINPUT // number
  }
});

Recommendation

Update to version 0.6.0 or later.

The npm package hosted-git-info before 3.0.8 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) via regular expression shortcutMatch in the fromUrl function in index.js. The affected regular expression exhibits polynomial worst-case time complexity

Versions of the package cross-spawn before 7.0.5 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.

The got package before 11.8.5 and 12.1.0 for Node.js allows a redirect to a UNIX socket.

This affects the package npm-user-validate before 1.0.1. The regex that validates user emails took exponentially longer to process long input strings beginning with @ characters.

npm-user-validate before version 1.0.1 is vulnerable to a Regular Expression Denial of Service (REDos). The regex that validates user emails took exponentially longer to process long input strings beginning with @ characters.

Impact

The issue affects the email function. If you use this function to process arbitrary user input with no character limit the application may be susceptible to Denial of Service.

Patches

The issue is patched in version 1.0.1 by improving the regular expression used and also enforcing a 254 character limit.

Workarounds

Restrict the character length to a reasonable degree before passing a value to .emal(); Also, consider doing a more rigorous sanitizing/validation beforehand.

shelljs is vulnerable to Improper Privilege Management

Impact

Output from the synchronous version of shell.exec() may be visible to other users on the same system. You may be affected if you execute shell.exec() in multi-user Mac, Linux, or WSL environments, or if you execute shell.exec() as the root user.

Other shelljs functions (including the asynchronous version of shell.exec()) are not impacted.

Patches

Patched in shelljs 0.8.5

Workarounds

Recommended action is to upgrade to 0.8.5.

References

https://huntr.dev/bounties/50996581-c08e-4eed-a90e-c0bac082679c/

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

• Ask at https://github.com/shelljs/shelljs/issues/1058
• Open an issue at https://github.com/shelljs/shelljs/issues/new