Semantic-release 9.1.1 is a minor update to the popular automated package publishing tool, building upon the functionalities of version 9.1.0. Both versions aim to streamline the release process by automating versioning, changelog generation, and package publishing based on semantic commit messages. Developers using semantic-release can expect consistent and predictable releases, saving time and reducing manual errors.
A notable difference between the two versions lies in their development dependencies. While the core dependencies remain the same, version 9.1.1 upgrades the prettier dev dependency from version 1.7.0 to 1.8.0. This improvement brings potentially new formatting rules and enhancements to the code formatting process during development. While this change might seem minor, it can affect code style and consistency for contributors, potentially leading to fewer formatting-related discussions in code reviews in order to encourage standardized and clean code.
Both versions rely on a robust set of dependencies, including chalk for colorful terminal output, execa for executing commands, github for interacting with GitHub repositories, and @semantic-release plugins for commit analysis, condition checking, and release note generation. This ecosystem of tools enables developers to configure semantic-release to work seamlessly within existing CI/CD pipelines, ensuring automated releases upon every merge according to their git flow configurations.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 9.1.1 of the package
Secret disclosure when containing characters that become URI encoded
Secrets that would normally be masked by semantic-release can be accidentally disclosed if they contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL.
Fixed in v17.2.3
Secrets that do not contain characters that become encoded when included in a URL are already masked properly.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in cross-spawn
Versions of the package cross-spawn before 7.0.5 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) due to improper input sanitization. An attacker can increase the CPU usage and crash the program by crafting a very large and well crafted string.
Exposure of sensitive information in follow-redirects
follow-redirects is vulnerable to Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in follow-redirects
Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in NPM follow-redirects prior to 1.14.8.
Follow Redirects improperly handles URLs in the url.parse() function
Versions of the package follow-redirects before 1.15.4 are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation due to the improper handling of URLs by the url.parse() function. When new URL() throws an error, it can be manipulated to misinterpret the hostname. An attacker could exploit this weakness to redirect traffic to a malicious site, potentially leading to information disclosure, phishing attacks, or other security breaches.
follow-redirects' Proxy-Authorization header kept across hosts
When using axios, its dependency follow-redirects only clears authorization header during cross-domain redirect, but allows the proxy-authentication header which contains credentials too.
Test code:
const axios = require('axios');
axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:10081/', {
headers: {
'AuThorization': 'Rear Test',
'ProXy-AuthoriZation': 'Rear Test',
'coOkie': 't=1'
}
})
.then((response) => {
console.log(response);
})
When I meet the cross-domain redirect, the sensitive headers like authorization and cookie are cleared, but proxy-authentication header is kept.
This vulnerability may lead to credentials leak.
Remove proxy-authentication header during cross-domain redirect
- removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);
+ removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:authorization|proxy-authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);
Marked ReDoS due to email addresses being evaluated in quadratic time
Versions of marked from 0.3.14 until 0.6.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service. Email addresses may be evaluated in quadratic time, allowing attackers to potentially crash the node process due to resource exhaustion.
Upgrade to version 0.6.2 or later.
Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity in marked
What kind of vulnerability is it?
Denial of service.
The regular expression inline.reflinkSearch may cause catastrophic backtracking against some strings.
PoC is the following.
import * as marked from 'marked';
console.log(marked.parse(`[x]: x
\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](\\[\\](`));
Who is impacted?
Anyone who runs untrusted markdown through marked and does not use a worker with a time limit.
Has the problem been patched?
Yes
What versions should users upgrade to?
4.0.10
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Do not run untrusted markdown through marked or run marked on a worker thread and set a reasonable time limit to prevent draining resources.
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity in marked
What kind of vulnerability is it?
Denial of service.
The regular expression block.def may cause catastrophic backtracking against some strings.
PoC is the following.
import * as marked from "marked";
marked.parse(`[x]:${' '.repeat(1500)}x ${' '.repeat(1500)} x`);
Who is impacted?
Anyone who runs untrusted markdown through marked and does not use a worker with a time limit.
Has the problem been patched?
Yes
What versions should users upgrade to?
4.0.10
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Do not run untrusted markdown through marked or run marked on a worker thread and set a reasonable time limit to prevent draining resources.
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in trim-newlines
@rkesters/gnuplot is an easy to use node module to draw charts using gnuplot and ps2pdf. The trim-newlines package before 3.0.1 and 4.x before 4.0.1 for Node.js has an issue related to regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) for the .end() method.
dot-prop Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Prototype pollution vulnerability in dot-prop npm package versions before 4.2.1 and versions 5.x before 5.1.1 allows an attacker to add arbitrary properties to JavaScript language constructs such as objects.
Got allows a redirect to a UNIX socket
The got package before 11.8.5 and 12.1.0 for Node.js allows a redirect to a UNIX socket.
http-cache-semantics vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service
http-cache semantics contains an Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity , leading to Denial of Service. This affects versions of the package http-cache-semantics before 4.1.1. The issue can be exploited via malicious request header values sent to a server, when that server reads the cache policy from the request using this library.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
npm ssri 5.2.2-6.0.1 and 7.0.0-8.0.0, processes SRIs using a regular expression which is vulnerable to a denial of service. Malicious SRIs could take an extremely long time to process, leading to denial of service. This issue only affects consumers using the strict option.
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request package is no longer supported by the maintainer.
form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary
form-data uses Math.random() to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:
Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici by parrot409 -- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random() is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.