Ts-jest version 22.4.6 represents a minor update over its predecessor, version 22.4.5, in the ts-jest package, a popular tool for integrating TypeScript with the Jest testing framework. Both versions share the same core dependencies, including essential libraries such as cpx, yargs, lodash, fs-extra, and babel-core, ensuring consistent functionality for transforming and processing TypeScript code during testing. The peerDependencies remain the same, highlighting the compatibility with specific Jest and TypeScript versions.
Examining the data reveals that the main differences reside in file metadata: the unpackedSize slightly increases from 246196 to 246800 bytes, and a later releaseDate implying bug fixes or minor enhancements. Developers adopting ts-jest can expect familiar behavior, but benefit from any potential stability improvements or refinements integrated into the newer release. For those heavily invested in optimizing their testing pipelines, the smaller size adjustments can contribute to marginally faster installations and execution times.
The consistent dependency footprint suggests that the update focuses on internal improvements and bug fixes rather than introducing groundbreaking new features, maintaining a stable and reliable testing experience for TypeScript projects using Jest. Potential users should always check the official changelog for more details.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 22.4.6 of the package
yargs-parser Vulnerable to Prototype Pollution
Affected versions of yargs-parser
are vulnerable to prototype pollution. Arguments are not properly sanitized, allowing an attacker to modify the prototype of Object
, causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.
Parsing the argument --foo.__proto__.bar baz'
adds a bar
property with value baz
to all objects. This is only exploitable if attackers have control over the arguments being passed to yargs-parser
.
Upgrade to versions 13.1.2, 15.0.1, 18.1.1 or later.
Babel vulnerable to arbitrary code execution when compiling specifically crafted malicious code
Using Babel to compile code that was specifically crafted by an attacker can lead to arbitrary code execution during compilation, when using plugins that rely on the path.evaluate()
or path.evaluateTruthy()
internal Babel methods.
Known affected plugins are:
@babel/plugin-transform-runtime
@babel/preset-env
when using its useBuiltIns
option@babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider
, such as babel-plugin-polyfill-corejs3
, babel-plugin-polyfill-corejs2
, babel-plugin-polyfill-es-shims
, babel-plugin-polyfill-regenerator
No other plugins under the @babel/
namespace are impacted, but third-party plugins might be.
Users that only compile trusted code are not impacted.
The vulnerability has been fixed in @babel/traverse@7.23.2
.
Babel 6 does not receive security fixes anymore (see Babel's security policy), hence there is no patch planned for babel-traverse@6
.
@babel/traverse
to v7.23.2 or higher. You can do this by deleting it from your package manager's lockfile and re-installing the dependencies. @babel/core
>=7.23.2 will automatically pull in a non-vulnerable version.@babel/traverse
and are using one of the affected packages mentioned above, upgrade them to their latest version to avoid triggering the vulnerable code path in affected @babel/traverse
versions:
@babel/plugin-transform-runtime
v7.23.2@babel/preset-env
v7.23.2@babel/helper-define-polyfill-provider
v0.4.3babel-plugin-polyfill-corejs2
v0.4.6babel-plugin-polyfill-corejs3
v0.8.5babel-plugin-polyfill-es-shims
v0.10.0babel-plugin-polyfill-regenerator
v0.5.3Prototype Pollution in JSON5 via Parse Method
The parse
method of the JSON5 library before and including version 2.2.1
does not restrict parsing of keys named __proto__
, allowing specially crafted strings to pollute the prototype of the resulting object.
This vulnerability pollutes the prototype of the object returned by JSON5.parse
and not the global Object prototype, which is the commonly understood definition of Prototype Pollution. However, polluting the prototype of a single object can have significant security impact for an application if the object is later used in trusted operations.
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to set arbitrary and unexpected keys on the object returned from JSON5.parse
. The actual impact will depend on how applications utilize the returned object and how they filter unwanted keys, but could include denial of service, cross-site scripting, elevation of privilege, and in extreme cases, remote code execution.
This vulnerability is patched in json5 v2.2.2 and later. A patch has also been backported for json5 v1 in versions v1.0.2 and later.
Suppose a developer wants to allow users and admins to perform some risky operation, but they want to restrict what non-admins can do. To accomplish this, they accept a JSON blob from the user, parse it using JSON5.parse
, confirm that the provided data does not set some sensitive keys, and then performs the risky operation using the validated data:
const JSON5 = require('json5');
const doSomethingDangerous = (props) => {
if (props.isAdmin) {
console.log('Doing dangerous thing as admin.');
} else {
console.log('Doing dangerous thing as user.');
}
};
const secCheckKeysSet = (obj, searchKeys) => {
let searchKeyFound = false;
Object.keys(obj).forEach((key) => {
if (searchKeys.indexOf(key) > -1) {
searchKeyFound = true;
}
});
return searchKeyFound;
};
const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar"}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
doSomethingDangerous(props); // "Doing dangerous thing as user."
} else {
throw new Error('Forbidden...');
}
If the user attempts to set the isAdmin
key, their request will be rejected:
const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar", "isAdmin": true}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
doSomethingDangerous(props);
} else {
throw new Error('Forbidden...'); // Error: Forbidden...
}
However, users can instead set the __proto__
key to {"isAdmin": true}
. JSON5
will parse this key and will set the isAdmin
key on the prototype of the returned object, allowing the user to bypass the security check and run their request as an admin:
const props = JSON5.parse('{"foo": "bar", "__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
if (!secCheckKeysSet(props, ['isAdmin', 'isMod'])) {
doSomethingDangerous(props); // "Doing dangerous thing as admin."
} else {
throw new Error('Forbidden...');
}
Server-Side Request Forgery in Request
The request
package through 2.88.2 for Node.js and the @cypress/request
package prior to 3.0.0 allow a bypass of SSRF mitigations via an attacker-controller server that does a cross-protocol redirect (HTTP to HTTPS, or HTTPS to HTTP).
NOTE: The request
package is no longer supported by the maintainer.
form-data uses unsafe random function in form-data for choosing boundary
form-data uses Math.random()
to select a boundary value for multipart form-encoded data. This can lead to a security issue if an attacker:
Because the values of Math.random() are pseudo-random and predictable (see: https://blog.securityevaluators.com/hacking-the-javascript-lottery-80cc437e3b7f), an attacker who can observe a few sequential values can determine the state of the PRNG and predict future values, includes those used to generate form-data's boundary value. The allows the attacker to craft a value that contains a boundary value, allowing them to inject additional parameters into the request.
This is largely the same vulnerability as was recently found in undici
by parrot409
-- I'm not affiliated with that researcher but want to give credit where credit is due! My PoC is largely based on their work.
The culprit is this line here: https://github.com/form-data/form-data/blob/426ba9ac440f95d1998dac9a5cd8d738043b048f/lib/form_data.js#L347
An attacker who is able to predict the output of Math.random() can predict this boundary value, and craft a payload that contains the boundary value, followed by another, fully attacker-controlled field. This is roughly equivalent to any sort of improper escaping vulnerability, with the caveat that the attacker must find a way to observe other Math.random() values generated by the application to solve for the state of the PRNG. However, Math.random() is used in all sorts of places that might be visible to an attacker (including by form-data itself, if the attacker can arrange for the vulnerable application to make a request to an attacker-controlled server using form-data, such as a user-controlled webhook -- the attacker could observe the boundary values from those requests to observe the Math.random() outputs). A common example would be a x-request-id
header added by the server. These sorts of headers are often used for distributed tracing, to correlate errors across the frontend and backend. Math.random()
is a fine place to get these sorts of IDs (in fact, opentelemetry uses Math.random for this purpose)
PoC here: https://github.com/benweissmann/CVE-2025-7783-poc
Instructions are in that repo. It's based on the PoC from https://hackerone.com/reports/2913312 but simplified somewhat; the vulnerable application has a more direct side-channel from which to observe Math.random() values (a separate endpoint that happens to include a randomly-generated request ID).
For an application to be vulnerable, it must:
form-data
to send data including user-controlled data to some other system. The attacker must be able to do something malicious by adding extra parameters (that were not intended to be user-controlled) to this request. Depending on the target system's handling of repeated parameters, the attacker might be able to overwrite values in addition to appending values (some multipart form handlers deal with repeats by overwriting values instead of representing them as an array)If an application is vulnerable, this allows an attacker to make arbitrary requests to internal systems.
tough-cookie Prototype Pollution vulnerability
Versions of the package tough-cookie before 4.1.3 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution due to improper handling of Cookies when using CookieJar in rejectPublicSuffixes=false
mode. This issue arises from the manner in which the objects are initialized.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in micromatch
The NPM package micromatch
prior to version 4.0.8 is vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The vulnerability occurs in micromatch.braces()
in index.js
because the pattern .*
will greedily match anything. By passing a malicious payload, the pattern matching will keep backtracking to the input while it doesn't find the closing bracket. As the input size increases, the consumption time will also increase until it causes the application to hang or slow down. There was a merged fix but further testing shows the issue persisted prior to https://github.com/micromatch/micromatch/pull/266. This issue should be mitigated by using a safe pattern that won't start backtracking the regular expression due to greedy matching.
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in braces
A vulnerability was found in Braces versions prior to 2.3.1. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks.
Regular Expression Denial of Service in braces
Versions of braces
prior to 2.3.1 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). Untrusted input may cause catastrophic backtracking while matching regular expressions. This can cause the application to be unresponsive leading to Denial of Service.
Upgrade to version 2.3.1 or higher.
Uncontrolled resource consumption in braces
The NPM package braces
fails to limit the number of characters it can handle, which could lead to Memory Exhaustion. In lib/parse.js,
if a malicious user sends "imbalanced braces" as input, the parsing will enter a loop, which will cause the program to start allocating heap memory without freeing it at any moment of the loop. Eventually, the JavaScript heap limit is reached, and the program will crash.