Vite 4.5.11 and 4.5.10 are incremental releases of the popular build tool designed for modern web development. Both versions share identical dependencies, including core tools like Rollup, esbuild, and PostCSS, ensuring consistent build performance and compatibility with existing projects. The listed devDependencies showcase Vite's robust ecosystem, featuring libraries for testing (like @rollup/plugin-typescript), utilities for module management (es-module-lexer, resolve.exports), and tools for optimizing assets (lightningcss, postcss-modules). Peer dependencies highlight Vite's flexibility regarding styling solutions (LESS, SASS, Stylus) and code minification (Terser), empowering developers to use their preferred technologies.
Examining dist details, version 4.5.11 shows a minor size increase in unpacked size (3353697 vs 3353434), which suggest small fixes and optimization improvements without major changes. The key differentiating factor lies in the release date, with v4.5.11 being released after v4.5.10. This implies that v4.5.11 likely includes bug fixes, minor enhancements, or security patches discovered since the previous release. For developers, upgrading from 4.5.10 to 4.5.11 is recommended to benefit from such improvements, ensuring a more stable and secure development experience. Due the small differences between the versions, a detailed list of changes is not easy to determine without referring to the release notes for these versions, which are the most reliable source of truth.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 4.5.11 of the package
Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
.svgRequests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.
This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'
Vite has an server.fs.deny bypass with an invalid request-target
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).
On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.
On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173
Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root
The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
.env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env**/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173
esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response
esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.
esbuild sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response.
https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121 https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363
Attack scenario:
http://malicious.example.com).fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js.In this scenario, I assumed that the attacker knows the URL of the bundle output file name. But the attacker can also get that information by
/index.html: normally you have a script tag here/assets: it's common to have a assets directory when you have JS files and CSS files in a different directory and the directory listing feature tells the attacker the list of files/esbuild SSE endpoint: the SSE endpoint sends the URL path of the changed files when the file is changed (new EventSource('/esbuild').addEventListener('change', e => console.log(e.type, e.data)))The scenario above fetches the compiled content, but if the victim has the source map option enabled, the attacker can also get the non-compiled content by fetching the source map file.
npm inpm run watchfetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/app.js').then(r => r.text()).then(content => console.log(content)) in a different website's dev tools.Users using the serve feature may get the source code stolen by malicious websites.