Vite 4.5.12 is a minor release over Vite 4.5.11, offering incremental improvements and bug fixes to the blazing-fast, next-generation frontend tooling. Both versions provide developers with a delightful development experience powered by native ESM, enabling incredibly fast cold starts and hot module replacement.
A key difference lies in the dist section. Vite 4.5.12 sees a slight increase in unpackedSize to 3354352 compared to Vite 4.5.11's 3353697 showcasing internal optimisations. The release date is another indicator of bug fixes.
For developers already using Vite 4.5.11, upgrading to 4.5.12 should be a seamless process and is recommended to leverage the latest refinements. New adopters will benefit from Vite's ecosystem, support for popular frameworks such as Vue, React, and Svelte, and features like optimized builds using Rollup under the hood, built-in TypeScript support, and a flexible plugin API. The dependency listings remain consistent between the versions, including crucial tools like esbuild for lightning-fast builds and PostCSS for CSS transformations. Vite empowers front-end developers to create modern web applications with unmatched speed and efficiency.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 4.5.12 of the package
Vite has an server.fs.deny bypass with an invalid request-target
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).
On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.
On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173
Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root
The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
.env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env**/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173
esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response
esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.
esbuild sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response.
https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121 https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363
Attack scenario:
http://malicious.example.com).fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js.In this scenario, I assumed that the attacker knows the URL of the bundle output file name. But the attacker can also get that information by
/index.html: normally you have a script tag here/assets: it's common to have a assets directory when you have JS files and CSS files in a different directory and the directory listing feature tells the attacker the list of files/esbuild SSE endpoint: the SSE endpoint sends the URL path of the changed files when the file is changed (new EventSource('/esbuild').addEventListener('change', e => console.log(e.type, e.data)))The scenario above fetches the compiled content, but if the victim has the source map option enabled, the attacker can also get the non-compiled content by fetching the source map file.
npm inpm run watchfetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/app.js').then(r => r.text()).then(content => console.log(content)) in a different website's dev tools.Users using the serve feature may get the source code stolen by malicious websites.